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STATE COURTS UNBOUND
Frederic M. Bloomt
We may not think that state courts disobey binding Supreme Court pre-
cedent, but occasionally state courts do. In a number of important cases,
state courts have actively defied apposite Supreme Court doctrine, and often
it is the Court itself that has invited them to.
This Article shows state courts doing the unthinkable: flouting Supreme
Court precedent, sometimes at the Court's own behest. The idea of state court
defiance may surprise us. It is not in every case, after all, that state courts
affirmatively disobey. But rare events still have their lessons, and we should
ask how and why they emerge. By unsettling constitutional substance and
excusing state court errors, the Supreme Court has permitted-even en-
couraged-state courts to rethink critical portions of existing Court doctrine.
It has written the story, that is, of "state courts unbound."
To bring that story into focus, this Article examines how the unbinding
process works, where we can see it, and why it warrants serious inspection.
In the process, this Article carefully recounts three illustrative chapters in the
tale of state courts unbound. One chapter grows out of Williams v. North
Carolina, a long-ignored discussion of migratory divorce. A second chapter
emerges in Lockyer v. Andrade, a more memorable study of California's
"three strikes" law. And a third chapter appears in Roper v. Simmons, a
controversial decision on the juvenile death penalty. All three of these chap-
ters show how state courts can, and sometimes do, defy still-valid Supreme
Court precedent. All three of these cases raise important questions about ju-
dicial motives, constitutional theory, and the balance of doctrinal power in
our adjudicative system. And all three encourage us to rethink what may
seem most familiar and to read carefully the story of state courts unbound.
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INTRODUCTION
State courts live by simple rules. One rule holds that state courts
may adjudicate federal questions-or most of them, at least.1 Another
rule permits state courts to play a pivotal role in the "elaboration of
federal constitutional principles."2 But still another rule says that state
courts may not reject binding Supreme Court precedent 3-or so we
tend to think.
There are good reasons to believe this third rule still holds true.
Venerable doctrine, 4 long-enforced court hierarchies, 5 and deep-
seated fears ofjurisprudential "chaos"6 all teach a now-familiar lesson:
1 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 467 (1990) (holding that state courts
typically have concurrent jurisdiction to hear federal claims).
2 Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 605, 637 (1981); id. at 627-29; see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1511 (1987) ("[I]nterposition theorists were right in believing that states
had a vital part to play in vindicating individual constitutional rights against federal en-
croachments .... ."); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502-03 (1977) (noting that state courts may "breathe new
life" into moribund constitutional terms).
3 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (claiming an exclusive Court "pre-
rogative" to correct its own doctrinal errors); see also infra Part V.
4 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-53 (1816).
5 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 (1994) ("[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always
bound to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior' to it.").
6 See id. at 821. As Dean Evan Caminker notes, several scholars argue that "courts
engaging in constitutional interpretation ought to renounce intracourt stare decisis and
approach each case as if writing on a clean slate." Id. at 820 (citations omitted). Some
scholars have gone even further, arguing that "the practice of following [a court's own]
precedent" is worse than "a bad idea; it is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Consti-
tution." Id. (quoting Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
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state courts must abide Supreme Court doctrine on questions of fed-
eral law. This is a brute fact of adjudication, a now-standard legal
refrain .
But like any refrain too many times repeated, this one has grown
a bit stale. So confident are we that state courts will not disregard
Supreme Court doctrine that we scarcely notice when and why they
actually do.
And state courts do flout Supreme Court precedent. In fact, state
courts have done so very recently and very insistently, nowhere more
clearly than in cases highlighting the Court's recent docket-like
Lockyer v. Andrade,8 Roper v. Simmons,9 and Smith v. Texas.'0
At first glance, these flashes of state court defiance may seem like
mere hiccups, minor flukes in an otherwise stable system of prece-
dent. After all, state courts seldom spurn their roles as "the simple
(and perhaps simple-minded) enforcer[s] of the Supreme Court's dic-
tates."11 But blind adherence to Court doctrine is a rule to which state
courts are only sometimes faithful. Every so often, state courts "under-
rule" 12 the Supreme Court on matters of federal law. Every so often,
that is, state courts actively disregard binding Supreme Court prece-
PUB. POL'x 23, 24 (1994)) (alteration in original). If there should be loyalty to anything,
the logic runs, it should be to the Constitution alone. See id. at 820.
7 See Caminker, supra note 5, at 820 ("[T]he doctrine of hierarchical precedent ap-
pears deeply ingrained in judicial discourse-so much so that it constitutes a virtually un-
discussed axiom of adjudication . . . ."); Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf 32 CORNELL L.Q.
137, 144 (1946) (placing this lesson in the "cantilena of lawyers"). Of course, familiarity
may also breed contempt, cf CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (compiling essays on what some
scholars consider to be the dumbest pieces of constitutional law), but the principle seems a
modern orthodoxy all the same, see Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Infer-
ior"Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REv. 843, 843-45 (1993).
8 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
9 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007).
11 Levinson, supra note 7, at 845. "The cases in which lower courts actually disre-
gard[] Supreme Court precedent, as opposed to merely stating a willingness to do so,"
Professor Steven Bradford rightly notes, "are few[ ] in number." C. Steven Bradford, Fol-
lowing Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court's Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59
FoRDiAM L. REV. 39, 46 (1990). But these "few" can still be momentous. Barnette stands as
one prominent instance of a federal court disregarding still-valid Supreme Court precedent.
See Barnette v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252-53 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), affd, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). Roper v. Simmons may soon stand as a paradigmatic state court analog.
12 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M.
Cover's Justice Accused, 7J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82 (1989). State courts may also attempt to
"anticipatorily overrule" the Supreme Court on matters of federal law. See Bradford, supra
note 11, at 41.
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dent-sometimes through clever bits of judicial "subterfuge"'13 and
sometimes in a far less timid fashion. 4
But why would a state court ever ignore Supreme Court prece-
dent? Taking such a step surely seems like a senseless gamble, a rash
venture with an inevitably unhappy end. Ignoring Supreme Court
precedent surely seems like a bet that state courts will invariably lose.
Yet not all state court defiance proves as impetuous or ill fated as
we might at first suppose. Some state court defiance actually suc-
ceeds-not because these "grab[s] for power"' 5 are too well camou-
flaged to notice, but because they can claim a rather unexpected
source of support: they have been invited by the Supreme Court. 16
Not that the Court's invitations are especially direct or conspicu-
ous. Nearly all of these calls come in coded legal whispers-about
strategically unsettled constitutional substance and overgenerous deci-
sion-making procedures-instead of dramatic doctrinal shouts.17 But
quietly and methodically, the Supreme Court has encouraged state
courts to ignore binding Court precedent-to act, in other words, as
"state courts unbound." We should hardly be surprised when state
courts agree.18
13 Caminker, supra note 5, at 819 (explaining that some courts cloak their disagree-
ment, "mouth [ing] the correct legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules'
logical consequences" (quotingJustice O'Connor's dissent in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993))).
14 See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975) (overruling a Supreme
Court opinion holding that the First Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus binding on the states).
15 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 249 (2004); see id. 249-53.
16 Not long ago, a batch of top scholars devoted significant attention to the idea of
"anticipatory overruling." See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 11, at 41; Charles J. Cooper, Stare
Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402-04,
409-10 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. LJ. 1361,
1371-72 (1988). Much of the fire seems to have gone out of this discussion, in part, no
doubt, because of the Court's seeming rejection of the core idea. See, e.g., Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989) ("[T]he Court of Ap-
peals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions."). But there is surely great value in this now-abandoned line
of thinking, and part of this Article's goal is to show that the Court's stem admonishment
does not always mean what it superficially says.
17 If there are shouts, in fact, they point in precisely the opposite direction. See State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
18 See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953) (noting that in some
contexts "state courts .... are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many
cases they may be the ultimate ones"); Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruc-
tion of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 1125, 1150-53, 1167-69 (2005); id. at 1220 ("[S]tate
courts . . . adjudicate issues of federal law with minimal review by the federal courts.");
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1128 (1986) (ex-
amining the forfeiture of federal rights in state courts); cf Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federal-
ist View ofArticle III: Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 237-38
[Vol. 93:501504
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What may startle is that the Court has asked state courts at all.
For decades, we have pictured the Supreme Court as the "ultimate
expositor of [ ] constitutional text,"19 our abiding (and often jealous)
source of doctrinal answers. This image may be a naive and mislead-
ing one, masking a swirl of deep but "conflicting commitments";
20 it
may even lull us into a dangerous kind of constitutional compla-
cence. 2' But the image of a Court "supreme" now seems "natural,"
even "desirable"22-so much so that the "principle of judicial
supremacy [has come] to monopolize constitutional theory and
discourse."23
In recent years, a number of top scholars have reignited the de-
bate over the Supreme Court's interpretive monopoly. 24 Some have
& n.112, 250 (1985) (explaining that the Framers did not intend to entrust protection of
the Constitution to state courts). It is one thing to allow state courts to resolve certain
federal questions; it is quite another to allow them to do so in ways that flout controlling
Supreme Court precedent.
19 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); see also Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution"). But see Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the
Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 401 (2005) ("Several legal scholars have recently come to
question this assertion, arguing that judicial supremacy deviates from the path of the
Founders .... ).
20 See KRAMER, supra note 15, at 221-24.
21 See id.; Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 175 (1986)
("We rely too heavily on the Supreme Court of the United States .... We give too much
responsibility to the Court, and too little to other institutions .... "); see also MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57-66 (1999) (using the term
"judicial overhang" to capture the notion that judicial review encourages others-includ-
ing the political branches-to ignore matters of constitutional compliance); Robert Nagel,
The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 380, 382 (1988) ("[Wle are becoming accustomed to the idea that the direction, the
emphasis, even the mood of Supreme Court opinions is a kind of official orthodoxy bind-
ing on everyone else in the society."); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the
Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 743 (2005) ("[I]t is striking how
limited and court-centered the executive's normative and institutional approaches to con-
stitutional questions remain."); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive
Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1559-66 (2005) (discussingjudicial supremacy in inter-
preting the Constitution and the possibility of creating "departmentalist" precedent).
22 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REv. 959, 960
(2004).
23 KRAMER, supra note 15, at 224.
24 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653, 653
(2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 15). Among the founding texts of this recent popu-
lar-constitutionalism revolution are KRAMER, supra note 15; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FAITH (1988); TUSHNET, supra note 21; JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
(1999); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002-Foreword: Fashion-
ing the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2003); and Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C.
L. REv. 773 (2002); cf Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 876-77 nn.330-31 (1997) (citing
literature on departmentalism); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of
Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U.L. REv. 719, 719-27 (2006).
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worked to realign the interpretive planets, placing "We the People,"
rather than the Court, at the center of our constitutional universe.
25
Others have encouraged the Court to move only in small increments,
cataloguing the virtues of "minimalist" and "incompletely theorized"
decisions. 26 Some have suggested that we pull the Constitution out of
the courts altogether, urging us to take our Constitution "back."
27
And still others have celebrated judicial supremacy's stabilizing na-
ture, detailing how the Court's interpretive primacy serves a valuable
"settlement function." 28
Yet for all of its impressive heat, this 'judicial supremacy" debate
has overlooked something that can shed important light. Missing
from this powerful dialogue is an account of how the Court sometimes
saps its own doctrinal power, how it subtly dislocates its own interpre-
tive primacy and, in so doing, amplifies the doctrinal power of state
courts. 29 This Article fills that significant gap, telling the vital story of
state courts unbound.
Like so many legal stories, this state courts unbound account
boasts an extensive cast. Part of this Article's goal is to unmask the
state courts unbound ensemble, from its unmistakable lead perform-
ers to its subtler, often recondite supporting actors. Each of these
players has its own lines to speak. But only together does this group
tell a recurring (if strangely overlooked) tale of state courts free to
spurn apposite Supreme Court precedent. This Article examines pre-
cisely how and when that story is told.
All good stories, of course, teach a durable lesson. Part of this
Article's mission is to recount that lesson, to show what lasting risks
and sturdy rewards the unbinding of state courts may have. To that
end, this Article closely reviews and connects three illustrations of the
25 See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (describing
"the people's" role in a dualist democracy); KRAMER, supra note 15 (positing "the people,"
not the Supreme Court, as the highest constitutional authority).
26 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3-14 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv.
1733, 1735-36 (1995).
27 TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 194.
28 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1371-72 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Constitu-
tional Interpretation]; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 468 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Defending
Judicial Supremacy]. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY 75-121 (2002) (criticizing populist scholars and their theories).
29 It is worth emphasizing that this thesis does not directly implicate state court litiga-
tion prompted by the Eleventh Amendment, cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), con-
gressional decision making under political question doctrine, see Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224 (1993), or agency adjudication under contemporary administrative law, see
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). All of those doc-
trines may work to empower state courts, but they do so in importantly different ways.
[Vol. 93:501
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state courts unbound theme-one historical and cautionary, two
more contemporary and critical. The first is Williams v. North Carolina,
a once-prominent portrait of the shadowy "ghost of 'unitary domi-
cil."' 30 The second is Lockyer v. Andrade, a still-prominent assessment
of California's (in)famous "three strikes" law.31 And the third is Roper
v. Simmons, a very recent evaluation of the juvenile death penalty. 32
At first glance, Williams, Andrade, and Simmons may seem to share
very little. In age, form, and substance, the three speak in very differ-
ent doctrinal tones. But in a slightly deeper register, Williams, An-
drade, and Simmons strike the same revealing note: each case depicts a
curiously empowered state court, a local tribunal free to proceed as if
not tethered to Supreme Court precedent.
In this, Williams, Andrade, and Simmons are hardly alone. Other
examples of unbound state courts exist, some in increasingly promi-
nent areas of contemporary doctrine. 33 But the purpose of this Arti-
cle is not to compile an exhaustive state courts unbound catalog. Nor
is it the goal of this piece to rehearse (or pretend to improve on)
more targeted studies of stare decisis,34 federalism's many "faces," 35 or
the populist benefits of "[o]ur [u]nsettled Constitution."36 This Arti-
cle aims, rather, to expose and explain the apparent anomaly of un-
bound state courts. As it does, this Article hopes to add new and
necessary texture to our dominant vision of doctrinal authority.
This Article proceeds in five steps. Part I develops the basic state
courts unbound idea: the notion that state courts can-and occasion-
ally do-defy binding precedent at the Supreme Court's own subtle
behest. To bring this thesis into clearer focus, Part I presents an (in-
tentionally) oversimplified illustration of the unbinding process at
30 325 U.S. 226, 244 (1945) (RutledgeJ., dissenting).
31 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
32 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005).
33 See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007).
34 For a particularly enlightening discussion of this rich subject, see Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); id. at
750 ("[T]he stability of our legal system depends on the doctrine of stare decisis."); Freder-
ick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). See also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666
(1999) (differentiating between "vertical" and "horizontal" stare decisis); Caleb Nelson,
Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the
implications of "strong" versus "weak" stare decisis principles). "Strong" or "weak," "verti-
cal" or "horizontal," "formalist" or "realist"-all are real stare decisis questions, and all are
largely elided here. I elide some because they have been meticulously and exhaustively
studied elsewhere, though I elide most because they are only peripheral to the "state courts
unbound" idea. What matters here is not some controversial wrinkle of stare decisis nu-
ance. What matters is the long-unquestioned idea that Supreme Court precedent always
binds state courts.
35 See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000).
36 Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION (2001); see id. at 8-9.
20081
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work. Through this example, we can assess what explanatory merit
the state courts unbound story holds, why state courts might behave so
boldly, and where the Court might find reason to encourage them to
do so.
Part II attempts to anchor the unbound story in historical con-
text. To that end, Part II revisits Williams v. North Carolina, a long-
neglected episode in the peculiar history of "migratory divorce." As
Part II shows, Williams is no small legal trifle. Instead, Williams under-
scores a key part of the unbinding process, showing how substantive
instability can aggrandize state court power. Part II then returns to
the broader state courts unbound thesis, noting the ways in which Wil-
liams does (and does not) foreshadow later chapters in the state courts
unbound tale.
Part III pulls this story forward, exploring a more moden, and
potentially more ominous, illustration of the state courts unbound
theme. For this, Part III reviews Lockyer v. Andrade, a centerpiece of
the Court's recent encounter with California's "three strikes" law. As
Part III explains, Andrade involves more than a perfunctory applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. It adds a second ingredient to the unbinding mix, blending
Williams-like substantive instability with an immense procedural ex-
cuse: the power for state courts to get constitutional questions wrong.
Part III shows how Andrade puts these pieces together.
Part IV then looks to Roper v. Simmons, the Court's most recent
evaluation of the juvenile death penalty. As Part IV notes, Simmons
may seem like a doctrinal oddity, a peculiar and isolated moment of
state court insolence. But when viewed in proper context, Simmons is
no aberration. It is a culmination, an almost inevitable next step on
the "unbinding" path set by the Supreme Court.
Along this path, difficult theoretical questions arise-about judi-
cial motivation, about constitutional philosophy, and about institu-
tional "parity. 37 Part V more closely surveys these questions, assessing
why the Court has ceded some of its interpretive authority, who this
effort may please or perplex, and whether state courts can be trusted
with the heady power to act as if unbound.
This Article then concludes, noting that recent pleas for state
court disobedience carry plenty of frantic bluster-but also a kernel of
important truth.
37 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (criti-
cizing the assumption that state and federal forums are equally competent to enforce fed-
eral constitutional rights).
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I
UNBOUND STATE COURTS: A FIRST LOOK
The story of unbound state courts may seem like a puzzle, a mys-
tery with its share of unexpected parts. In one part, a state court de-
fines an inherently unstable bit of constitutional text.3 8 In another, a
state court selects among apparently incompatible, though equally
valid, Supreme Court decisions. 39 In the next part, a state court
brashly declares the Constitution in need of immediate updating.40
And in still another, a state court buries its disobedience in the mud
of arcane state law. 41 Very little seems to link these doctrinal pieces.
Even less suggests that they shape a discernable whole.
But if these pieces seem superficially disconnected, they soon re-
veal a common thread. What unites these state court opinions is al-
most hidden in plain sight: each decision reaches an outcome
seemingly contrary to relevant Supreme Court precedent. Each state
court goes, that is, precisely where the Court told it not to go.
Why would any state court think to do such a thing? Few legal
turns seem quite as unpromising as disregarding apposite Supreme
Court doctrine. So why would a state court ever think such a course
appropriate-let alone endorsed by the Supreme Court?
And why, in turn, would the Supreme Court ever think to allow
it? On matters of doctrinal power, after all, the Court rarely seems
inclined to share.42 So we might wonder why the Court tolerates un-
binding when it does. Is the answer bland logistics, a sensible Court
hope that state courts will shoulder more of the doctrinal load?
43 Is it
a nod to a particular constitutional theory-whether judicial federal-
ism, 44 (Sunstein-esque) minimalism, 45 or "popular constitutional-
38 See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
39 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68-71 (2003).
40 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
41 See Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007).
42 Congress and the Executive have both been caught in what some have termed the
Court's "grab for power." See KRAMER, supra note 15, at 249; see also SEIDMAN, supra note 36,
at 92 (deeming the Court's insistence on settling the constitutional dispute in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and its attendant fears
of delegitimation, "simply a bugaboo").
43 Cf LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 121, 127 (1994) (noting
that certain "formally neutral" benefits-like efficient adjudication-may attend state
court litigation of federal claims).
44 This judicial federalism may take the form of local autonomy and laboratory-like
experimentation. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932); see also
William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 778 (1987) (discussing "perturbation [s]" of federalism).
45 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 27-31 (2005); cf id. at 28 ("Minimalists
celebrate the system of precedent . . . partly because respect for precedent promotes
stability .... ").
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ism"? 46 Or is it substantive preference, a covert fondness for
particular outcomes? 47 All of these potential motives warrant genuine
analysis. All may play crucial, if unpredictable, roles in the unbinding
tale. So, in time, we will review the Court's unbinding intentions,
tracking both its reasons and its results.
48
But before we can understand the Supreme Court's motives, we
must be careful to make sense of how and when unbinding works.
This Part attempts to resolve those preliminary mechanical issues, de-
veloping the state courts unbound thesis as it goes. Subpart A first
frames the unbound thesis in generic terms, using competing expla-
nations for state court defiance to outline the core unbinding idea.
Subpart B then posits an (intentionally exaggerated) example of the
unbinding process at work, bridging the distance between abstract
thesis and authentic case law.
A. What Unbinding Is (and Is Not)
So why might a state court disregard Supreme Court doctrine,
boldly or otherwise? Supreme Court precedent typically issues a
rather uncomplicated demand: it calls to be followed, no matter how
unenthusiastic its followers may be.49 So why would a state court ever
ignore it, snubbing the highest of judicial commands?
46 See KRAMER, supra note 15, at 8. Dean Kramer's vision of popular constitutionalism
may well support even more state-court involvement than the "state courts unbound" thesis
describes. At its most basic, popular constitutionalism aims to restore the Constitution to
its rightful owners-viz., the People. See id. State courts are not perfect surrogates for the
People, but they may be far better stand-ins than their federal cousins. Unlike federal
judges, many state judges stand for popular election, cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, a process that
introduces at least some political accountability to the judicial sphere, however imperfectly.
See Wendell L. Griffen, Comment, Judicial Accountability and Discipline, 61 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Summer 1998, at 75, 75.
47 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1226 (2004) ("[T]here is the very real
concern whether jurisdictional outcomes are ... the product of naked ideology.").
48 See infra Part V.
49 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (holding that "[a]ll provi-
sions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting" racial discrimination in public
education "must yield" to the principle that such discrimination is unconstitutional).
There are, of course, certain decisions that the Court intends not to be followed. See Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 25 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment) ("[T]he Court may have succeeded in confining this novel principle almost
narrowly enough to be, like the proverbial excursion ticket-good for this day only.. ..");
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances. .. ."). And there are plenty of occasions during which enthusiasm for precedent
wavers, even if interest in it never seems to wane. Among the many studies of precedent, a
few stand out. See Ahkil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv.
757, 810 n.191 (1994) ("This point may be especially important to those Justices who care
most about precedent and stability."); William Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
735, 739 (1949) ("One measure of stability is the extent to which precedents are over-
ruled."); Monaghan, supra note 34, at 750-51 ("[T]he stability of our legal system depends
on the doctrine of stare decisis."); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWrH OF THE LAw
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One reason may be conscience-what Judge Niemeyer has called
a "constant anchor" in our shared "human makeup." 50 Some state
courts, guided by an insistent normative sense of "what ought to be,"
might choose to follow conscience's path, even at the expense of
more positive doctrinal demands. 51
Another reason may be mere carelessness, a "sloppy or inept"
state court approach to questions of federal law. 52 The bug ofjudicial
inattention has many ugly symptoms, from misreading Supreme Court
precedent to overlooking it outright. State courts are hardly
immune. 53
And still another reason may be opportunism, that "black art
of specious [fact] distinction. '54 Since no two cases are ever perfectly
identical, some cynical state courts might distinguish precedent
into "practical oblivion. '55 After all, the familiar (if complicated)
2 (1924) (noting that in the law "[r]est and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally
destructive"); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 88 (1986) (explaining that "[t]he practice
of precedent, which no judge's interpretation can wholly ignore," tempers the differences
between judges and presses their decisions toward convergence); RoscoE POUND, INTER-
PRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923) ("Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand
still."); Richard Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARv.
L. REV. 32, 40 (2005) ("[I]t is rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court
constitutional decision that it was decided correctly or incorrectly.").
50 Paul V. Niemeyer, Law and Conscience, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1994);
cf Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (S.D. Ala. 1983) ("Let us have
faith in the rightness of our charter and the patience to persevere in adhering to its
principles.").
51 Niemeyer, supra note 50, at 1016 (emphasis added). The line between conscience
and impudence can be a fine one. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 259
(1990); Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 155, 188 (1992); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 235-36 (1990) ("[T]he enterprise, now several
thousand years old, of establishing the existence and content of a natural law that under-
writes positive law is hopeless under the conditions of modern American society."); H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
52 See Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1731, 1763 (2000).
53 State courts are hardly the only courts to exhibit such carelessness. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, "The King of France with Forty Thousand Men"- Felker v Turpin and the Supreme
Court's Deliberative Processes, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 163, 179-80 (1996) (discussing "spurious"
judgments made by members of the Supreme Court).
54 Maurice Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 3, 4
(1967); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (discussing the "endless variations
in [ ] facts and circumstances" that can arise in doctrine (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 506 (1983))); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS 84-87 (1960) (cataloguing ways to distinguish precedent).
55 David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the
Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 327 (2000); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86
IOWA L. REV. 601, 624 (2001) ("What constitutes precedent in a particular case is a flexible
concept that is subject to interpretation, especially when considering cases that are not
directly on point."); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495,
499-500 (1985) ("Take any case that is to be decided and any other case that has already
been decided. However similar they may be, in respects that may seem important, they will
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charge to "treat like cases alike" matters very little for "unalike"
cases.
56
All of these explanations tell us something. Surely some state
court disobedience results from conscience-driven, sloppy, or oppor-
tunistic state courts. Perhaps even most state court disobedience
does. But not all state court defiance grows from these obvious
sources. Some state court defiance features a more curious wrinkle.
Some state court defiance, in fact, follows a path set by the Supreme
Court itself.
In generic terms, this unbinding path takes two steps. One step
involves the unsettling of constitutional substance--a "shaking up"
57 of
relevant law such that constitutional "answers" are unusually difficult
to find. Of course, much of the law is muddled, if not entirely "wobbly
[and] moth-eaten."58 Many legal terms are wrapped in hopeless
"open-textured" uncertainty.59 But some legal provisions depict more
than passing or unavoidable ambiguity. They display an intentionalju-
dicial unsettling, a focused Court effort to render key phrases-like
"full faith and credit"60 and "cruel and unusual punishments"61-both
confusing and confused.
A second unbinding step involves the use of generous procedural
methods-an adoption of decision-making processes that shield even
"incorrect" state court decisions from reversal. 62 There is nothing es-
pecially novel, of course, about granting state courts some interpretive
"wiggle room. ' 63 Deference to lower courts, whether state or federal,
is a familiar feature of modern appellate review. But there is some-
thing both strange and significant about permitting state courts to
make blatant doctrinal errors and then forbidding other courts from
correcting these missteps.64 The Supreme Court has done both.
Even more, the Court has put unbinding's two halves together. It
has merged unsettled substance with an expansive procedural excuse.
also be different in some respects, and vice versa."); Schauer, supra note 34, at 594 ("[l]t
will always be possible to distinguish a precedent . .
56 See Schauer, supra note 34, at 595-96.
57 Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1502 (2005).
58 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (citation omitted).
59 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
11-41 (1980).
60 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
62 See Frederic M. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679 (2005); see
also Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Forward: The Court's Agenda-And the
Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (2006) ("[P]rocess... [is] an overused word that encom-
passes determinations of both who is to decide an issue and the procedures according to
which an issue is to be decided.").
63 See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great"Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1111, 1151 (2001).
64 See Bloom, supra note 62, at 1723.
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It has made correct doctrinal answers difficult to find and excused
state courts from the sometimes burdensome task of actually finding
them. In so doing, the Court has subtly depleted its own doctrinal
power, thereby supplementing the doctrinal power of state courts.
And in so doing, the Court has done much more than reiterate old
jurisprudential truths about "wobbly" substance or deferential proce-
dure. It has revealed how even the most cautious, careful, and morally
neutral state court might come to believe itself unbound by Supreme
Court precedent. And it has cast a penetrating light on its own furtive
role in encouraging it.65
B. A Simplified Example
Of course, even the most piercing light only reveals so much, es-
pecially when filtered through such an abstract lens. So to bring this
unbinding puzzle into better focus, a more concrete (if fanciful) illus-
tration of the unbinding process may help.
Imagine, then, that the Supreme Court has issued Decision A, an
opinion holding that the imposition of a life sentence for overtime
parking raises no Eighth Amendment concern. 66 Imagine, too, that
comparable Case B eventually arrives before the Connecticut Su-
preme Court, asking whether a life sentence for double parking runs
afoul of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.
67
At first glance, the state court's task in Case B seems rather
straightforward: It must follow Decision A.
Left to its own devices, of course, the state court may agree with
Decision A's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment; it may not. It
may prefer to punish illegal parking in the way that Decision A allows;
it may prefer something different altogether. But unless the state
court is eager to start a (futile) judicial fight, what it agrees with or
prefers does not matter. All that matters-or seems to matter-is what
Decision A says.
As it happens, Decision A is not of especially recent vintage.
Since announcing Decision A, the Court has penned two additional
decisions, both relevant to Case B. One of these new decisions (Deci-
sion Y) calls the substance of Decision A into question, deeming Deci-
sion A "misguided under Eighth Amendment doctrine" and "dubious
65 On extremely rare occasion, the Court is not quite so surreptitious. Both Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), seem to promote
lower court disregard of precedent, albeit in contexts in which relevant precedent had
been implicitly overruled.
66 Cf Rummel v. Estelle, 455 U.S. 263, 274 n.l (1980) ("This is not to say that a
proportionality principle would not come into play.., if a legislature made overtime park-
ing a felony punishable by life imprisonment.").
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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on its facts," if still somehow "good law." 68 The other (Decision Z)
posits a new procedural rule, one that precludes federal courts from
reversing "merely incorrect" state court decisions in certain con-
texts-including the one in which Case B arises.
69
Neither Decision Y nor Decision Z expressly requires state courts
to reject Decision A; neither explicitly says that A is "overruled. ' 70 But
both Y and Z do say something relevant to the state court's review of
Case B-about what doctrine to consider, about what weight prece-
dent carries, about what consequences will follow a mistake.
For the Connecticut Supreme Court, Decisions Y and Z may say
plenty. Decisions Y and Z may convince the otherwise cautious state
court to refute Decision A, or at least to turn a conveniently blind eye.
Decision Y, after all, has deeply unsettled the substantive water, mak-
ing the "correctness" of Decision A unclear.71 Decision Z, in turn, has
curiously eased the state court's decision-making obligations, shield-
ing even "erroneous" state court decisions from federal court reversal.
So perhaps Y and Z will persuade the Connecticut court to cast dubi-
ous Decision A aside.
To the litigants in Case B, this state court choice will surely mat-
ter. The parking-ticket defendant in Case B would plainly prefer to
see Decision A ignored.
For most others, however, Case B's particular outcome makes lit-
tle difference. What matters more is that the state court's choice was
not clearly foretold. In Case B, the state court could have tracked
Decision A, toeing (perhaps) an ill-fated legal line.72 Or it could have
defied Decision A, risking a suspect "brand of judicial activism.
73
Each option demands a steep price.
68 In this sense, the Court has not implicitly overruled Decision A. Cf Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 303 n.32 (1983) ("Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, our conclusion
today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.").
69 See generally Bloom, supra note 62 (examining contexts in which federal courts are
prevented from remedying "incorrect" state court decisions).
70 Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (expressly overruling Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (expressly over-
ruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
71 "[T]he most serious difficulty for the practice of precedent is the incidence of con-
flicting precedents-past decisions that provide, in effect, incompatible guidance for aju-
dicial decision." Lyons, supra note 55, at 501 (noting that this makes it "impossible to
follow all precedents"). Such doctrinal conflicts are often, though not always, a key ingre-
dient in the state courts unbound recipe. See infta, Parts III, IV, V.
72 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1, 73 (1994) (arguing that, in some narrow
circumstances, inferior courts "should engage" in prediction); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction
and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 715 (1995) (urgingjudges to "resist the tempta-
tion [to predict] because the prediction model undermines the rule of law . . ").
73 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); cf Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272
(7th Cir. 1984) ("[A]n intermediate federal appellate court may properly decline to follow
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But neither option should come as a great surprise, especially to
the Court. With Decisions Yand Z, the Supreme Court did more than
answer discrete legal questions. The Court sent important doctrinal
signals, whispering hints about murky substantive answers and wider-
than-normal procedural latitude. Not all state courts will respond to
these signals in the same way. Not all state courts will opt to refute
Decision A, no matter how "misguided" it may appear. But all state
courts will receive the Court's signals. And some state courts will
choose to follow them-not because these courts feel especially auda-
cious or antagonistic, but because the Supreme Court itself has quietly
invited them to do so.
To a skeptical eye, of course, this example may seem rather self-
serving and crude. Almost nothing the Court does is especially trans-
parent; something as intricate as the unbinding of state courts seems
an unlikely exception to that rule. But the (over)simplicity of Case B's
story should not obscure what it aims to show: Sometimes state courts
openly disregard Supreme Court precedent. And sometimes it is the
Supreme Court that encourages them to do so.
In many ways, this encouragement is strange enough. Since state
courts typically abide time-honored rules, like "obey Supreme Court
doctrine," anything that undercuts these rules raises serious method-
ological and doctrinal concerns, even for judicial supremacy's most
dogged critics.74 These concerns are pronounced, even magnified,
when that process takes an exaggerated form, as it did in Case B.
But these concerns are no less acute when the unbinding process
follows a less conspicuous path. The Parts that follow consider three
subtler, entirely authentic state courts unbound portraits. Williams v.
North Carolina outlines the first, highlighting the importance of unset-
tled constitutional substance. Lockyer v. Andrade frames the second,
introducing the significance of pardoned state court mistakes. And
Roper v. Simmons shapes the third, showing unbinding at full tide.
None of these cases follows a path as transparent as Case B's. None
involves anything as banal as a parking mishap. But the complexity of
these portraits bears its own significant reward: Williams, Andrade, and
Simmons give shape and context to the state courts unbound thesis,
explaining its relevance to cases confronting the Supreme Court even
now. They also show that the state courts unbound story demands
serious attention-not simply as a twist on a tired jurisprudential re-
frain, but as a critical account of precedent, interpretive authority,
and state court power to declare Supreme Court decisions wrong.
a U.S. Supreme Court decision when convinced that the Court would overrule the decision
if it had the opportunity to do so ....").
74 See KRAMER, supra note 15, at 234-53.
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II
UNBINDING IN HISTORY: WILLIAMS V. NORTH CAROLINA
We have nearly forgotten Williams v. North Carolina.75 The dated
parable of "deserted wives" and "wayward husband[s] ,"76 the long
struggle over "full faith and credit, '77 the quiet triumph of "strict lia-
bility in the Supreme Court"78-all sound rather distant to modern
ears. So faint is Williams's once-familiar ring, in fact, that the authors
of our family law "canon" have opted largely to ignore it.
79
To be fair, Williams is not the easiest case to remember. Decades
have passed since the "scandal"80 of migratory divorce grabbed na-
tional attention. In that time, the matrimonial landscape shifted dra-
matically: marriage found its constitutional roots;8 1 divorce entered its
no-fault era.8 2 All the while, Williams inched ever closer to obscurity.
But we should not let Williams slip out of memory too quickly.
This Part attempts to show why Williams merits renewed attention,
both as a cultural record8 3 and as a window onto the idea of unbound
state courts. To begin, subpart A revisits Williams's unassuming legal
story. Subpart B then highlights a wrinkle of Williams now almost uni-
versally ignored: the way unsettled substance enabled a state court to
shape federal constitutional law at its whim. Subpart C then places
this wrinkle in doctrinal context, assessing how Williams does and does
not presage later iterations of legal uncertainty and unbound state
courts.
75 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
76 Joseph Walter Bingham, Song of Sixpence: Some Comments on Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 13 (1943). To be exact, Williams is also a story of a "deserted"
husband and a "wayward" wife. See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 227. In many ways, the Williams
case turned on issues of "domicil," as we will see. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 194-210 (1942) (discussing domicil generally,
as well as in the context of Winans v. Winans, 91 N.E. 394 (Mass. 1910), a once-prominent
divorce case); Willis L.M. Reese, Does Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 589,
589 (1955) (citing Williams II in discussing the importance of domicil in the context of
divorce).
77 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
78 Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARv. L. REV. 828, 852 (1999).
79 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825 (2004); cf
Gerhart Husserl, Some Reflections on Williams v. North Carolina II, 32 VA. L. REv. 555, 555
(1946) (noting the story's "familiar ring").
80 Cf Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1233, 1233 (1963); Husserl, supra note
79, at 555.
81 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
As Professor Michaels notes, there is some dispute "about whether clear recognition of the
right to marry as fundamental came in 1967... or in 1978." Michaels, supra note 78, at
856 n.146. Either way, the date comes well after Williams does.
82 See Helen Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58
TEx. L. REv. 501, 501 (1980).
83 See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 181-88 (1962).
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A. Reviving Williams
The story of Williams v. North Carolina started almost meekly. It
opened in May of 1940, as Otis Williams and Lillie Hendrix began the
long drive from North Carolina to Las Vegas. 84 Both Williams and
Hendrix were in search of a divorce, though not from each other.
8 5
Hendrix hoped to split from a husband of twenty years, Williams from
a wife of even longer.8 6
At the time, Nevada law required that a person "reside[ ] [only]
six weeks in the state before suit [for divorce could] be brought.
8 7
So, between early May and late June, Williams and Hendrix waited
together in a Nevada "auto-court for transients."8 8 As soon as the sev-
enth week arrived, each claimed Nevada domicile and filed a petition
for divorce in Nevada's state courts.8 9 On October 4, both petitions
were granted.90 And on October 4, Williams and Hendrix were mar-
ried, this time to each other.9 1
Within days, the newlyweds returned to North Carolina.92 But if
the pair had any hope of "happy domesticity," their dreams were soon
dashed.93 Not long after the couple's return, North Carolina indicted
them for "bigamous cohabitation. '94 Both were convicted by a state
jury, notwithstanding Nevada's seemingly valid divorce (and mar-
riage) decrees.9 5 Both were sentenced to three-year prison terms-
84 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 289 (1942).
85 See BLAKE, supra note 83, at 181-88.
86 See id.
87 Williams I, 317 U.S. at 290 n.3 (citation omitted). North Carolina had a more de-
manding standard at the time, and this mattered for Williams and Hendrix themselves.
That it was more demanding is not what remains important, however, What remains im-
portant is that it was different-and that the Court permitted it to be.
88 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 236 (1945).
89 See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 289.
90 Id. at 289-90.
A decree of divorce was granted petitioner Williams by the Nevada court on
August 26, 1940, on the grounds of extreme cruelty, the court finding that
the plaintiff has been and now is a bona fide and continuous resident of the
County of Clark, State of Nevada, and had been such resident for more
than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this action in
the manner prescribed by law. The Nevada court granted petitioner Hen-
drix a divorce on October 4, 1940, on the grounds of wilful neglect and
extreme cruelty and made the same finding as to this petitioner's bona fide
residence in Nevada as it made in the case of Williams. Petitioners were
married to each other in Nevada on October 4, 1940.
Id. at 290 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see BLAKE, supra note 83, at 181
(noting that neither defendant-that is, neither original spouse-took any action in
Nevada).
91 See BLAKE, supra note 83, at 181.
92 See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 290; BLAKE, supra note 83, at 181 ("On October 4, 1940,
[.. (Hendrix] married Williams and the couple returned to North Carolina.").
93 BLAKE, supra note 83, at 181.
94 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945).
95 See id. at 241.
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even though, by then, "one of their former spouses was dead and the
other had remarried."96 Both appealed.
97
In a very narrow sense, the appeal in Williams presented an unex-
ceptional question of criminal law: did Otis Williams and Lillie Hen-
drix violate North Carolina's prohibition against "bigamous
cohabitation"-against marrying another, that is, while still being
married?98
In a slightly broader, more theoretical sense, Williams posed a
chronic riddle of legal status: What does "true domicil" require?99
Does it demand mere "physical presence" 10 0 for whatever "special or
temporary purpose,"'0 1 or does it entail something more durable-a
more permanent "nexus between person and place"?10 2
In an even broader structural sense, of course, Williams involved
more than "truant lovers"' 03 and "over-the-counter divorces." 10 4
Folded into Williams's story of domestic disorder was a serious ques-
tion of interstate comity and the workings of our federalist system:
What respect should one state give to the judgments of another? Must
a state abide every judgment of another state's courts, even when those
judgments conflict with-or prove "repugnant" to-the state's own
law?'
0 5
To legal textualists, the answer to this question is plain: all judg-
ments of one state command the full respect of every other, no matter
how suspicious. 10 6 The bare terms of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
make no exceptions, so even divorces granted "by mail or tele-
phone .. .should enjoy coerced recognition anywhere."' 1 7 Anything
96 Id. at 266 (Black, J., dissenting); see Thomas Reed Powell, And Repent at Leisure: An
Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina
Hath Put Asunder, 58 HARv. L. REV. 930, 964 (1945) (" [N] either the acquiescence of earlier
companions nor their later death or remarriage has any legitimate bearing on whether
North Carolina can penalize what she has penalized here.... Punishment is the hand-
maiden of prevention . . ").
97 See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 289-90.
98 See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 227 & n.1; see also Michaels, supra note 78, at 835 (discuss-
ing bigamy as a strict liability crime).
99 See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 231 (citing Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907)).
100 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 424 (1975).
101 Williams II, 325 U.S. at 236.
102 See id. at 229.
103 Bingham, supra note 76, at 2.
104 Powell, supra note 96, at 932.
105 See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1987 (1997) (asking whether one forum can refuse to
recognize the decree of another "on the ground that it promotes a policy the [first] forum
finds repugnant").
106 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 42
(2006).
107 Powell, supra note 96, at 930; see also Kramer, supra note 105, at 2003 ("To begin,
the text of the Clause says that full faith and credit shall be given . . ").
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less, Justice Rutledge cautioned, risked turning the Full Faith and
Credit Clause into a "dead constitutional letter."'
08
To more "pragmatic" legal thinkers' 0 9-or, to use Professor Pow-
ell's pithier label, less "extreme libertarian[s]"I 0-the answer is
neither so obvious nor so categorical: not every judgment in one state
is conclusive and all-powerful in every other. The text of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause may speak in broad and inclusive terms, but
some state judgments are so suspect that a "sister-State" need not
abide them. Some judgments are so infirm that they deserve no "con-
stitutional sanctity" at all.'
On Williams's first trip to the Supreme Court, the Justices kept to
the periphery of this difficult full faith and credit debate."t 2 The
Court did, in this first look, overturn the couple's bigamy convictions,
granting the pair a temporary reprieve.'1 3 But any resolution the
Court may have offered was strictly and expressly "limited"' 14-So
much so that North Carolina promptly ignored Nevada's decrees a
second time, trying and convicting the couple again.
115
Soon after this reconviction, Williams made a second visit to the
Supreme Court. This time, the Court sided with North Carolina, af-
108 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I1), 325 U.S. 226, 245 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Congress may well have the power to alter this dynamic. Article IV, section 1
permits Congress to make "general Laws [that] prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
This so-called Effects Clause may inspire exegetical nightmares, see Kramer, supra note 105,
at 2001, but it may also permit Congress to untangle awkward byproducts of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
109 I use this term hesitantly. "Pragmatic" is an especially elastic label, one sufficiently
amorphous to have been applied almost indiscriminately. Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and Breyer have all been
deemed pragmatists. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
2 (1996) (compiling this list). "Pragmatic" has even been applied to justice Rutledge, the
very voice of strong textualism in Williams. See Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Juris-
prudence, and Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10
GEO. MASON L. REv. 59, 89 (2001) ('Justice Rutledge was selected largely on the recom-
mendation of Felix Frankfurter, and his jurisprudential views were essentially pragmatic."
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The label is no less ubiquitous
"[a]mong theorists of adjudication." Posner, supra, at 2. As Judge Posner notes, it has
"been applied not only to those who call themselves pragmatists, of whom there are now
quite a number, but also to Ronald Dworkin, who calls pragmatism ... an intellectual meal
fit only for a dog (and I take it he does not much like dogs)." Id.
110 Powell, supra note 96, at 930 (calling the antagonists of "extreme libertarian[s]"
"doctrinaire . . .ritualists" prone to ceaseless reevaluation).
III See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229; id. at 242 (Murphy, J., concurring).
112 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942) (deeming a
precise definition of North Carolina's "power ... to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada
divorce decrees" unnecessary).
113 See id. at 292-93, 304.
114 Id.
115 See BLAKE, supra note 83, at 182.
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firming the couple's bigamy convictions. 116 And this time, the Court
struck a deliberately practical full-faith-and-credit balance, forging a
"necessary accommodation," in Justice Frankfurter's words, of the
states' "conflicting interests."
11 7
By its terms, this "accommodation" permitted little judicial sec-
ond-guessing. Most aspects of Nevada's divorce decrees, Williams ex-
plained, were immune from reconsideration in North Carolina-no
matter how dubious.
But not all reexamination was entirely "foreclosed."'118 North
Carolina could reconsider jurisdictional facts, those core matters (like
"bona fide domicil" 119) that invested Nevada with the authority to de-
cide a case at all. More than that, North Carolina could apply a differ-
ent domiciliary standard in this reassessment, imposing its own more
rigorous measure of the couple's status in Nevada-regardless of what
Nevada itself had done. 120 So when North Carolina reevaluated and
disregarded Nevada's own finding of "domicil," it breached no full-
faith-and-credit limit. 12 1 And when North Carolina prosecuted Wil-
liams and Hendrix for bigamous cohabitation, it did nothing constitu-
tionally wrong.
122
For Williams and Hendrix, this "necessary accommodation"
brought a long legal voyage to an unhappy end. Because a North Car-
olina court could, and did, declare their divorce decrees invalid, the
couple went to jail as bigamists, even though they remained lawfully
wed elsewhere. 12
3
But for other couples and the Court itself, the odyssey of migra-
tory divorce was nowhere near its finish. In the years that followed, a
steady stream of divorce appeals reached the Supreme Court, each
offering a new full faith and credit riddle to solve. 124 Over time, these
cases folded together in a kind of "patchwork without pattern"125 -a
116 See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 226.
117 Id. at 231-32. "Practical," of course, does not mean simple. See id. at 232-33.
118 Id. at 230.
119 See id. at 227, 230-32.
120 Id. at 241. It is worth recalling that this standard did not need to be more exacting.
It could have been more rigorous or less, more exacting or less. But it could be different,
and that is all that matters. Had North Carolina demanded residency of ten minutes or ten
years, its constitutional latitude would have been equally robust, allowing it to make any
kind of "domicil" conclusion-and, thus, full faith and credit decision-it liked.
121 See id. at 233-35.
122 See id. at 237-39.
123 Id. at 247 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("So the marriage is good in Nevada, but void
in North Carolina .... ).
124 See BLAKE, supra note 83, at 183 (noting that Massachusetts, Florida, and New York
happily picked up where North Carolina and Nevada left off).
125 ELY, supra note 59, at 146.
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"crazy quilt," to borrow Justice Jackson's metaphor, of American di-
vorce laws.
126
As the Court added layers to this quilt, others made calls for legis-
lative reform. 127 Many of these calls went unheeded-some because
of flaws in the reforms, others because of doubts about the reform-
ers. 128 But these political setbacks did not dull the demand for
change. Less than thirty years after Williams fashioned its "necessary
accommodation," the reformers dramatically succeeded: No-fault di-
vorce "burst" into national prominence, and permissive divorce laws
swept into vogue.1 29 Social forces-far more than doctrinal ones-
wrote Williams off the page.130
B. Accommodation and Instability
For good reason, this extraordinary cultural shift has drawn sub-
stantial academic attention. The turbulent history of "[d] ivorce [as] a
legal act,"131 the steady evolution of "collusive and underhanded" al-
ternatives, 132 the sudden explosion of "permissive" divorce re-
gimes 133-all have inspired thoughtful and detailed review.
But Williams did more than unleash a powerful surge of social
energy. Williams also helped forge a curious legal framework, a deci-
sion-making structure with unexpected winners, habitual losers, and a
strange array of litigants caught in between. Williams left, that is, a
rather odd legal legacy.
Why should we care about this legacy, however strange? If Wil-
liams is now just another footnote in the long and winding history of
American divorce, why should we care about preserving it, let alone
paying it much heed?
Part of the reason is the law's persistent echo. Old legal problems
have a way of bouncing back, returning to relevance in slightly mod-
ernized form.13 4 Yesterday's debate about migratory divorce sounds
much like today's "national conversation" about same-sex marriage.
1 35
126 Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 680 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
127 See, e.g., BLAKE, supra note 83, at 186-87.
128 See id.
129 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63
OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984) ("The old system collapsed completely; no-fault rushed into
the vacuum.").
130 See id. at 664-69.
131 Id. at 649.
132 Id. at 662.
133 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 65, 86 (1998).
134 Cf Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1945) (noting that some legal "books" are difficult to "close[ ]").
135 See Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 1690, 1700-02
(2002) ("Striking parallels also exist between the campaign against same-sex marriage and
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Faithful records of the former, like Williams, may well help make bet-
ter sense of the latter.13
6
Another part is jurisprudential mystery. Few constitutional provi-
sions have proven as "baffling" and stubbornly undertheorized as the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 137 No landmark study cracks the
Clause's thick shell; no "luminous exposition by [Chief Justice] Mar-
shall" sheds clarifying light.138 What little explanatory evidence exists,
then, has a rare value, even if part of now-anachronistic precedent.
And another part of the reason to remember Williams is the criti-
cal lesson it teaches about substantive instability and the power of state
courts. Much has been written in the last quarter-century about "con-
stitutional unsettlement"-the idea that deep uncertainty infects con-
stitutional law. Some have praised this type of uncertainty.1 39 Others
have derided it.1 40 Still others have deemed it jurisprudentially inevi-
table, a kind of "predictable unpredictability." 141 But not even unset-
tlement's most rigorous students have examined how this instability
subtly expands state courts' doctrinal authority. Nowhere is this state-
empowering instability more prominent than in Williams. Nowhere
but Williams, in fact, is this uncertainty so clearly a kind of "constitu-
tional policy.'
4 2
If Williams made uncertainty a "constitutional policy," of course,
the Court may have had good reasons. No full faith and credit frame-
the longstanding battle against divorce and polygamy." (citation omitted)). See generally
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 2215 (2005) (providing a history of same sex marriage, one that can be compared to
the history of migratory divorce).
136 Cf Kramer, supra note 105, at 1965. For a thoughtful discussion of Williams's lin-
gering impact, see Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. Civ. RTs. & Crv. LIBERTIES 1, 15 (2005).
137 SeeJackson, supra note 134, at 2 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928)); id. at 3 ("This clause is relatively... neglected .... ).
138 Id. at 3; see id. at 7 ("Not until 1813 was the Supreme Court called upon to consider
the faith and credit clause . . . ."); id. at 34; see alsoJackson, supra note 134, at 3, 34; J.H.C.
Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1287, 1288 (1951) (calling "it in the highest
degree uncertain whether and in what circumstances the Supreme Court will intervene" in
divorce-related full faith and credit debates). The Federalist Papers also leave this all-im-
portant clause relatively unaddressed. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264, 266-67 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
139 See SEIDMAN, supra note 36, 8-9 (touting unsettlement's populist benefits); see also
Tom Baker, Alon Harel, & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOwA L. REV. 443, 445 (2004) ("[W]e argue that uncertain sanctions may be
preferable on efficiency grounds . . ").
140 See Alexander & Schauer, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 28, at 1372-73.
141 Brannon P. Denning, Against (Constitutional) Settlement, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 781,
782 (2002).
142 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I1), 325 U.S. 226, 244 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
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work will ever be perfect.143 By its nature, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause seems to demand the unattainable: both "nationalist" authority
and "federalist" autonomy,144 both workable theory and "hard practi-
cality," both respect for out-of-state judgments and the reservation of
certain decisions to individual states.1 45 So if Williams appears analyti-
cally blurry, 146 and if the Court's "accommodation" caught a few liti-
gants unaware,1 47 we may forgive the Court some of these flaws. We
might even cheer the Court's caution, commending it for going "no
farther than [it should] go."'
1 4 8
But we may worry as well. On occasion, the Court's prudence
holds its own subtle perils. Some Court half-steps raise more ques-
tions than they answer. And some "minimalist" Court "nudges"-to
borrow Professor Sunstein's fitting term 149-unsettle more than they
resolve.
Williams's accommodating "nudge" did just that. Rather than
resolving an urgent interstate conflict, the Williams Court simply side-
stepped the fight. And though the intent of this judicial sidestepping
may have been perfectly admirable, its effect produced something
143 See Kramer, supra note 105, at 1968 (explaining that these systems will never be
"neat or tidy").
144 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv.
1141, 1144-58 (1988) (assessing "Nationalist" and "Federalist" models of thought); Jack-
son, supra note 134, at 17.
145 Williams II, 325 U.S. at 233; see Kramer, supra note 105, at 1967; id. at 1976 ("[T]he
Full Faith and Credit Clause... looks on its face as if it were written for precisely this sort
of problem.").
146 See Powell, supra note 96, at 930 (asking if the opinion "shed darkness rather than
light").
147 The Court's accommodation caught no one more unaware than Otis Williams and
Lillie Hendrix. Compare Williams II, 325 U.S. at 238 (concluding that Williams and Hendrix
"assumed the risk" that North Carolina would find that "they had not been domiciled in
Nevada"), with id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's unjustifiable devitalization
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . .makes the North Carolina statute an inescapable
trap for any person who places the slightest reliance on another state's divorce de-
cree ...."), and id. (Black, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court's opinion makes
liberty a "very cheap thing"). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 44, at 777-78 ("Consistent
with this last check-the 'checking effect' of federalism-a state cannot smugly pursue its
own agenda as though the state existed in a geographic vacuum, or as though the state
were hermetically sealed at its borders.... [F]ederalism exerts its own leavening constraint
on [all states].").
148 See Powell, supra note 96, at 930; see also Williams II, 325 U.S. at 243 (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the decision pushes "civilization [no closer] to an end" (citation
omitted)); SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at xiii ('Justice Felix Frankfurter was a distinguished
minimalist.").
149 SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 30 ("The point is that all minimalists accept the follow-
ing proposition: For judges, nudges are much better than earthquakes."); see also Daniel A.
Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of
Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REv. 848, 850-51 (2005) (positing the "tectonic model" of legal
change); Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, The Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297,
2350 (2001) (declaring Professor Sunstein's minimalism "less convincing than the old
formalism").
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rather strange. With no clear or predictable full faith and credit stan-
dard, 150 state courts could manipulate full faith and credit at their
whim. Each state court, that is, could determine what "full faith and
credit" meant for itself.
What "full faith and credit" meant in any particular case was, after
Williams, unclear. In fact, after Williams, "full faith and credit" could
mean "everything and nothing"151 at once. It could demand com-
plete (textualist) respect for out-of-state judgments in one case and
nothing at all in the next; it could demand "one thing" in Case A and
"quite a different thing" in comparable Case B.152 But where the
Court assigned these important full faith and credit decisions was be-
yond any question: They belonged to state courts.
A state court made this decision in Williams. Applying its own
strict domiciliary standard, a North Carolina court chose to disregard
Nevada's divorce decrees, deeming them unworthy of full faith and
credit-or any real "credit" at all.
153
And perhaps the Williams state court was right.154 Perhaps the
North Carolina court rooted out illicit litigant motives. Perhaps it
protected the state's most sensitive policy interests and prevented a
suspicious legal end run. Perhaps the state court even struck an ideal
constitutional balance, capturing the essence-in Dean Kramer's
phrase-of "what it means to be in a Union."155
But the critical issue in Williams is not whether the state court got
a specific decision right or wrong. The crucial issue is what Williams
reveals about the link between unsettled constitutional substance and
unbound state courts. 156 Had the Williams state court so preferred, it
could have read "full faith and credit" broadly, extending unequivocal
respect to the most dubious of out-of-state judgments. Or had the
state court so preferred, it could have read the clause narrowly, con-
verting full faith and credit into a system of "half good [s] and half
bad[s]."157 Either way, this pivotal choice was entirely the state court's
150 Williams II, 325 U.S. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
151 Jorge Luis Borges, Everything and Nothing, in LABYRINTHS 248, 248 (Donald A. Yates
& James E. Irby eds., James E. Irby trans., 1964).
152 Baltimore v. Baltimore R.R., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 543, 551 (1870) ("The word ex-
pense may mean one thing in one case and quite a different thing in another.").
153 See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 227.
154 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position Debate,
1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 39, 66 (1987). If state juries are as capricious as they often
appear, of course, some full faith and credit answers will almost inevitably be correct, if
only by virtue of luck.
155 Kramer, supra note 105, at 2006.
156 See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 246 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (explaining that state
courts may not redefine "full faith and credit" at their whim). If the Court retained any
supervisory function in this, it is one more porous than solid. See id. at 251.
157 Esin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 554 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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to make, not because the Constitution demands as much,15 8 but be-
cause intentionally unsettled substance gave state courts the power to
choose.
C. Uncertainty's Prevalence
Things could have gotten stranger still. Had they the chance,
state courts might have turned the Full Faith and Credit Clause into a
kind of constitutional "nulli[ty] ,' ' 15 using their expansive doctrinal
power as a kind of ever-ready federalist weapon. But before that op-
portunity emerged, social forces intervened: no-fault divorce rose to
national prominence, refraining the entire marriage debate from the
inside.' 60 As this happened, Williams's gravest risks seemed to dissi-
pate: Fears of chaotic interstate rivalry lessened. Concerns about dra-
matic interstate disrespect faded away-or at least went into legal
hibernation.1
61
But if Williams's perils came to very little, their promise should
not be ignored. Behind Williams's parable of wayward wives and ab-
sconding husbands is a lesson worth repeating: Unsettled substantive
law can and sometimes does permit state courts to "speak the last
word"162 on pivotal questions of federal law. Odder still, unsettled
substance may even invite state courts to disregard decisions the Court
itself has already made. These invitations may arrive rather quietly,
moving in accommodating "nudges" rather than judicial "earth-
quakes."1 63 They may even look like laudable minimalist turns. But
their impact can be quite momentous, and they are there for state
courts to see.
This instability is also there for the Supreme Court to replicate.
To students of the modern judiciary, of course, the idea of Court-
made uncertainty may seem unexceptional, if not somewhat trite.
Substantive uncertainty now seems almost ubiquitous-sometimes ap-
pearing in mazes of hopeless doctrinal confusion, 164 sometimes acting
as a tool for reallocating constitutional power. In United States v. Lopez,
for example, the Court used "legal uncertainty" to "restrict" Con-
158 See Williams I, 325 U.S. at 245 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution has
[not] confided to the caprice of juries the faith and credit due the laws and judgments of
sister states.").
159 Id. at 232.
160 See Friedman, supra note 129, at 664.
161 See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 135 (discussing the reemerging debate over the meaning
of "full faith and credit" in the context of gay marriage).
162 Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645, 650 (1991).
163 SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 30.
164 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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gress's regulatory reach. 165 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court used "con-
stitutional improvisation" to "increase" its own authority.
166
In this important sense, Hamdi, Lopez, and Williams seem like
cases of a common stripe. All feature "legal uncertainty" of a kind.
All depict careful Court attention and a subtle (re)distribution of
power.
But if Williams resembles Lopez and Hamdi from a distance, it ap-
pears very different from up close. Where Lopez and Hamdi use legal
uncertainty to consolidate Supreme Court power, Williams employs
uncertainty to diffuse it. Where Lopez and Hamdi display entirely un-
surprising "grab[s] for [Supreme Court] power,"'167 Williams shows a
counterintuitive delegation to state courts. And where Lopez and
Hamdi leave state courts on the constitutional sideline, Williams puts
them in the doctrinal center, unbinding "local trier[s]" to make fed-
eral constitutional law anew. 168
In the end, of course, Williams may still strike us as somehow triv-
ial, a forgettable relic of a cultural battle fought many years ago. But
there are still pieces of Williams we should be careful to remember.
We should remember Williams's chronicle of a marital battle much
like one being fought now. We should remember Williams's gloss on a
stubbornly undertheorized constitutional phrase. And we should re-
member Williams's image of unsettled substantive law and empowered
state courts.
On their own, each of these lessons warrants our attention and a
firm place in legal memory, even when viewed through the dated
prism of migratory divorce. But when joined by a second player, Wil-
liams's lessons strike an even more insistent chord. This second
player-viz., the procedural pardoning of state court errors-has
much to say in the state courts unbound story. In Lockyer v. Andrade,
this second player takes center stage.
III
UNBINDING YESTERDAY: LOCKYER v. ANDRADE
At first glance, Williams and Andrade seem an unlikely pair. One
case speaks of migratory divorce and long treks to Nevada; the other
tells of criminal recidivism and stolen videos. One case helped spur a
165 514 U.S. 549, 630 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167 KRAMER, supra note 15, at 249.
168 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11), 325 U.S. 226, 246 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); see Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1585,
1610-11 (1985) (noting the potential for "problems where none previously existed" when
state courts "make law anew on the basis of fresh perceptions of governmental policies").
"[L]iberty [may] find[ ] no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992), but expanded state court power might.
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significant cultural shift; the other provoked little change at all. 169
One case is now old enough to be all but forgotten; the other is still
young enough for most to recall. 1
70
But if Williams and Andrade seem at first like only distant doctrinal
cousins, they soon prove a very compatible match. Both recount joy-
less domestic struggles-as well as trips to state jail. Both raise serious
questions about cryptic constitutional text and rich legal history. 171
And both paint revealing portraits of empowered state courts, the sec-
ond case adding to the lessons of the first.
This Part examines Lockyer v. Andrade in careful detail. Subpart A
begins with an account of Leandro Andrade's luckless encounter with
California's "three strikes" law. Subpart B places that encounter in
substantive legal frame, exploring the Williams-like instability of mod-
ern Eighth Amendment "proportionality" jurisprudence. Subpart C
reinforces that legal frame with an examination of unbinding's proce-
dural side: modern habeas corpus law. Subpart D then reviews An-
drade as a doctrinal whole, showing how unstable substance merges
with deferential procedure to leave state courts effectively unbound.
A. Leandro Andrade
Leandro Andrade is no model of redemption. His life does
count some cheerful moments, stretches of military service, and hon-
est parenthood.1 72 But Andrade's defining feature is not growth or
reflection. It is disappointment-and a stubborn tendency to relapse.
Andrade's most notorious relapse came in late 1995, when he
stole a handful of videotapes from a California retail store. 173 Two
weeks later, Andrade did it again.1 74 Each time, he was spotted and
detained by private security personnel.1 75 Each time, he was arrested
by local police. 
176
These were not Andrade's first arrests. Since 1982, Andrade had
been "in and out of state and federal prison" for misdemeanor theft,
for first-degree residential burglary, for transportation of marijuana,
169 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1049, 1065-67 (2004) (discussing studies showing that the state's three strikes law has had
no measurable impact on California's crime rate).
170 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Williams II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
171 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 129, at 661-65; Kramer, supra note 105, at 1976-86.
172 Erwin Chemerinsky, Cruel and Unusual: The Story of Leandro Andrade, 52 DRAKE L.
REv. 1, 1 (2003) (describing Andrade as "a nine-year Army veteran and father of three").
173 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66.
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 See id.; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 1 ("Andrade ... was caught shoplift-
ing ... Snow White, Casper, The Fox and the Hound, The Pebble and the Penguin, and Batman
Forever. .... -).
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and for a state "parole violation."' 77 So when Andrade stole his first
videotape, he was already a repeat offender. And when he was con-
victed of two counts of "petty theft with a prior,"' 78 he triggered the
strict terms of California's "three strikes law."
California's three strikes law is unforgiving by design. Passed to
"ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment" for con-
victed offenders who commit additional felonies, the law mandates a
sentence of "at least 25 years to life" for eligible third-strike crimes.
179
Andrade's two petty theft offenses qualified as separate "strikes," and
the trial court sentenced him accordingly, prescribing "two consecu-
tive terms of 25 years to life in prison."'
80
On direct appeal, Andrade argued that his sentence violated the
federal Constitution.18 ' In particular, he alleged that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited such "grossly disproportionate" punish-
177 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66-67; see also Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28
U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 677, 727-28 (2003) (reviewing Andrade's facts).
178 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 68. Under California law, "petty theft with a prior" is a so-
called wobbler offense, a misdemeanor offense that can, at the prosecutor's discretion,
wobble up" to the status of a felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 1998). The prose-
cutor opted to prosecute both of Andrade's video thefts as felonies, subjecting him to an
especially-and perhaps incongruously-serious punishment. See Chemerinsky, supra note
172, at 15 ("[I1t is noteworthy that if Andrade's prior convictions had been for violent
crimes, such as murder or manslaughter, his maximum punishment for the two acts of
shoplifting would have been one year in prison.").
179 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1998). California's three strikes law actually con-
sists of two substantively identical statutes, one enacted by the California legislature, see
1994 Cal. Stat. 71 (adding California Penal Code § 667(b)-(i)), the other passed by a ballot
initiative, see Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12 (West 2004) (added by Initiative Measure (Proposi-
tion 184, § 1, approved Nov. 8, 1994)). See generally In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 177 (Cal.
2001) (explaining the history and application of California's three strikes law). The law
treats only "serious" or "violent" felonies as prior strikes, but the principal offense may be
any felony under California law, not necessarily a "serious" or "violent" one. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(d)(1) (West 1998); id. § 667.5(c); id. § 1170.12(b)(1) (West 2004); id.
§ 1192.7(c); id. § 1192.7(c) (all defining "serious" and "violent"); see also Ewing v. Califor-
nia, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (noting that the purpose of California's three strikes law is to
impose longer sentences on criminals who commit or have previously committed "serious"
or "violent" felonies); Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari). See generally Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743,
747-48 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (explaining the application of California's
three strikes law to "serious" and "violent" felonies).
180 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 68. Andrade's sentence precludes him from even filing a peti-
tion for parole for at least fifty years-twenty-five years for his first theft, twenty-five more
for the second. In this sense, it is more precise (if ungainly) to say that Andrade has been
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences, each without the possibility to petition for
parole for at least twenty-five years. Awkward as this phrasing may be, it captures a nuance
missing from the more-familiar "25 years to life" label, reminding that it is not the case that
Andrade will be released, at the latest, after fifty years. Only then can he begin to ask to be
discharged.
181 Id. Andrade's Eighth Amendment claim has proven the most memorable, but it
was not the only one he raised. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
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ment.18 2 Paying little attention to Supreme Court doctrine, a Califor-
nia appellate court disagreed." 3 The California Supreme Court
refused discretionary review.
18 4
Not long thereafter, Andrade reasserted his Eighth Amendment
claim in a petition for federal habeas relief. 185 The district court de-
nied Andrade's petition. 8 6 A split panel of the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. 187 The Supreme Court then reversed again, reinstating the
state court's decision and consigning Andrade to a life in state jail.18
Reaction to the Court's Andrade decision was swift and often
heated. A few defended the Supreme Court's decision; some praised
Andrade's healthy "reluctance to interfere with States' administration
of their criminal justice systems," even on such pitiful facts.'8 9 But
most observers were far less sanguine. One lamented the Court's
"dramatically inconsistent approaches to the Constitution and punish-
ment." 90 Another accused the Court of "merely 'pricking the lines,"'
of moving in ad hoc steps "when it comes to the question of when
sentences are excessive."' 9' Still another warned that "[i]f Andrade's
182 See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 70.
183 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 01-1127)
(citation omitted).
184 See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 69.
185 The petition arrived before the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations.
See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 743-44.
186 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 69.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 70. Much of the Court's decision sounds of turgid legalese, not least the
opinion's very first sentence. In this sentence, what might have seemed a relatively
straightforward issue of constitutional law-namely, whether the Eighth Amendment per-
mits California to sentence Andrade to life in prison for his offenses-becomes an arche-
type of hypertechnical prose. The sentence:
This case raises the issue whether ... the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that
the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Leandro Andrade's two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction
is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by [the Supreme] Court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1).
Id. at 66.
189 Doyle Horn, Note, Lockyer v. Andrade: California Three Strikes Law Survives Challenge
Based on Federal Law that Is Anything But "Clearly Established, "94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
687, 687 (2004). Horn's interpretation of the phrase "clearly established" is, in this con-
text, almost surely wrong. See infra note 199.
190 Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1080; see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89
MINN. L. REV. 571, 644-45 (2005) (agreeing with Justice Souter's dissent in Andrade);
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REv. 677,
695-98 (2005) (examining the Supreme Court's "disparate renderings of 'proportional-
ity'"); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
266-68 (2005) (discussing apparent inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's recent consti-
tutional proportionality decisions).
191 Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and
Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REv. 880, 920 (2004).
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sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no mean-
ing" at all.' 92 On both practical and theoretical levels, these critics
implied, Andrade simply got it wrong.
And perhaps these critics are right. "[I] nconsistent approaches,"
"prick[ed] lines," hollowed constitutional "principle [s] "-each may
fairly describe the Court's efforts in Andrade. Each may warrant a full
measure of academic or judicial rebuke.
But there is something strangely absent from Andrade's doctrinal
postscript. What sealed Leandro Andrade's fate was not merely an
abstract constitutional principle or a "fundamentally subjective"
method of 'judicial oversight."1 93 What sealed Andrade's fate was an
unbound state court, a California tribunal at liberty to reach any out-
come it liked.
1 9 4
But how was this state court unbound in Andrade? If California's
court could truly chart its own Eighth Amendment "path"195-wise or
foolish, right or wrong-why was this so?
Part of the answer comes from a now-familiar actor on the "un-
binding" stage: unsettled constitutional substance, this time of an
Eighth Amendment type. 196 Another part of the answer comes from a
second unbound player, a strangely generous review procedure that
prevents even "incorrect" state court decisions from being set aright.
These two players conspire in Andrade to unfetter a state court, freeing
that court to reach whatever Eighth Amendment decision it wished.
And these two players merit careful review here, beginning with the
one we now recognize: unstable substantive law.
B. Proportionality and Uncertainty
We have seen unstable substance before. In Williams v. North Car-
olina, unstable substance emerged in "full faith and credit" and "bona
fide domicil," masking its volatility in prudent disguise. 197 In Lockyer v.
192 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193 Karlan, supra note 191, at 883.
194 See id. at 884 n.13. Professor Karlan puts it succinctly:
Indeed, the Court found its prior decisions so murky that it essentially fore-
closed federal habeas review of sentence length .... Given the Court's
prior decisions, which reached different outcomes on the basis of relatively
small differences in the facts, it is probably always possible to show why the
instant case is more like one case than another ....
Id.
195 See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 70.
196 Some of the academy's best scholars have already charted the "overly complex"
twists and "absurdly arcane" turns of particular lines of Eighth Amendment doctrine. See,
e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 358 (1995).
197 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945).
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Andrade, it appears in recidivism and criminal punishment, revealing
an uncertainty too pervasive to hide.
Nearly everything is unstable in Andrade. Constitutional text, le-
gal history, Court doctrine, penological theory-all are "uncertain [ ],"
as Justice O'Connor candidly admits.198 Even the phrase "clearly es-
tablished federal law" takes an ironically ambiguous turn, shifting
from a long-recognized temporal limit into a novel check on substan-
tive "clarity."'199
At the root of this confusion is "proportionality," the seemingly
simple notion that some things should fit pleasingly with others. 200
Proportionality is no stranger to the law. The term "proportion" ap-
pears twice in the Constitution,20' its logic endures in the words of the
Framers, 20 2 and the concept colors an array of modern doctrinal
lines.2
03
198 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 n.2.
199 Id. at 71-72. This may seem an understandable mistake, for the difference may be
one of mere emphasis: "clearly established" or "clearly established." But the mistake is still a
real one, and the issue is not as difficult as Justice O'Connor seems to suggest. Until An-
drade, the meaning of "clearly established federal law" was narrow and uncomplicated: the
term denoted the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th [el Court's decisions as of the time
of the relevant state-court decision." Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000))
(emphasis added). The Court in Andrade misreads this simple chronological rule, mistak-
enly adding a clarity limit to the well-known temporal one. See 538 U.S. at 72 ("The diffi-
culty with Andrade's position, however, is that our precedents in this area have not been a
model of clarity. Indeed, in determining whether a particular sentence for a term of years
can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have not established a clear or consistent path for
courts to follow." (citations omitted)). In so doing, the Court unintentionally calls a great
deal of its own doctrine into doubt.
200 See generally John Dewey, ART AS EXPERIENCE 45-48 (1934) (discussing the impor-
tance of proportion in art and elsewhere).
201 Once in relation to "tax[es]" being "laid," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, and again with
regard to "representation" being "reduced," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
202 See, e.g., Letter from ThomasJefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 553 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977)
(1975). Thomas Jefferson also discussed the concept of proportionality in notes that he
wrote while in Virginia in 1781. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia
(1781-1782), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 23, 163.
203 Takings Clause case law, Dormant Commerce Clause decisions, and Fourteenth
Amendment precedent all employ some sort of proportion-based logic. See, e.g., City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999) (explaining that the
rough proportionality test used by the Court of Appeals in deciding the Takings Clause
issue was unnecessary to decide the case but relevant to the decision of the court neverthe-
less); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("We think a term such as 'rough
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment."); see also Frase, supra note 190, at 598-621 (discussing examples of three propor-
tionality principles-"limiting retributive proportionality, utilitarian 'ends' proportionality,
and utilitarian 'means' proportionality"-in American constitutional law); Ristroph, supra
note 190, at 293 (spotting proportionality in "familiar evaluative mechanisms" like "narrow
tailoring").
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But familiarity has not eased all anxiety. Proportionality's legal
status remains more fitful than faithful, especially when it concerns
criminal punishment.
The problem is not lack of interest. Few ideas have attracted
more sustained attention than that of "proportionate penalties."
Some have thought this idea entirely natural, even intuitive-utilitari-
ans, because it marks out the model line between "[lt] he value of the
punishment" and "the profit of the offence"; 20 4 "retributivist theo-
rists," because it comports with the concept of 'just deserts."
20 5
Others have thought proportionality review entirely untenable be-
cause it undercuts political bargains20 6 and lures courts outside their
narrow range of institutional competence.20 7 Yet the Supreme Court
has long thought such review entirely possible, and it has located pro-
portionality squarely in Eighth Amendment text. Since 1910, the
Court has read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to require
204 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
166 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1982) (1789); cf ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-30 (1974); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 97 (1993)
(reminding that the proportionality argument is "political and not metaphysical").
205 See Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 (2000)
("The question is only whether, roughly speaking, the punishment imposed is accurate
with respect to the person's desert."); Ristroph, supra note 190, at 279-84; id. at 279 ("A
principle of just deserts can . . . demand proportionality between offense and sanc-
tion .... ). "Most arguments for proportionality review," Professor Ristroph explains, "are
variants of the call for the 'constitutionalization' of substantive criminal law, a call famously
made by Henry M. Hart almost 50 years ago and subsequently echoed by many others." Id.
at 268 n.13 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 409-11 (1958)). In large measure, "[t]hese calls have gone unheeded." Id.
206 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part);
see also Karlan, supra note 191, at 884 ("[T]he Rehnquist Court has been engaged in an
implicit 'exit strategy[ ]' [from the use of a proportionality standard,] refining the consti-
tutional test in a way that 'preserves the Court's ability to reenter the field should circum-
stances or doctrine or the Justices' view of the Constitution change,' while essentially
foreclosing relief in contemporary cases." (quoting Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Con-
stitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the I-east Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 667, 687 (2002))); Posner, supra note 49, at 42-47; id. at 45 (arguing that political
considerations exert a strong influence on "constitutional adjudication in the Supreme
Court").
207 Put slightly differently, the use of proportionality review replaces objective judicial
analysis with judge-specific whim. Cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy,J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes
involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is properly within the
province of legislatures, not courts." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Proportionality's historical and textual provenance has been challenged as well. See, e.g.,
id. at 966-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); id. at 977 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("[T]o
use the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment' to describe a requirement of proportional-
ity would have been an exceedingly vague and oblique way of saying what Americans were
well accustomed to saying more directly.").
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that criminal penalties be "graduated and proportioned to [the rele-
vant] offense."
2 18
Between 1910 and 1980, this gloss on the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause seemed rather stable. In long lines of doctrine-and
across generations of Justices-the Court repeatedly reaffirmed
Eighth Amendment proportionality review.209 It even did so in
"prison term" cases like Andrade.210
But in 1980, the Court started to waver. And by the early 1990s,
the Court's prison-term proportionality doctrine was decidedly
unsure.
The uncertainty did not appear all at once. Instead, it emerged
in the span of three cases, each new decision compounding the confu-
sion of the old. The first case was Rummel v. Estelle, where the Court
first turned away from "strict" proportionality review2 1 and declared a
life sentence permissible for a nonviolent recidivist who obtained
$120 by "false pretenses." 21 2 The second case was Solem v. Helm, where
the Court deemed a life sentence impermissible for a nonviolent re-
cidivist who "utter[ed]" a $100 "no-account check." 21 3 And the third
case was Harmelin v. Michigan, where a deeply fractured Court pro-
claimed a life sentence permissible for a first-time drug offender.214
For litigants like Andrade, this string of cases was surely perplex-
ing. Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin all endorsed some kind of propor-
tionality review, however halfheartedly. 21 5 And because no one case
208 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910); id. at 371 ("[T]he inhibition
[of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] was directed not only against punish-
ments which inflict torture, 'but against all punishments which, by their excessive length or
severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.'" (quoting O'Neil v. Ver-
mont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting))).
209 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Weems, 217 U.S. at
366-67.
210 See, e.g., Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 ("Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."); Weems, 217 U.S. at
380-81 (holding that a sentence of fifteen years in prison for the falsification of a public
document was "cruel and unusual," as some "degrees of homicide [] are not punished [as]
severely").
211 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." (citations omitted)).
212 445 U.S. 263, 266, 285 (1980) (noting that the precise sum is actually $120.75).
213 463 U.S. 277, 281-82, 303 (1983). In this case, "strong" proportionality review
made a fleeting comeback-a sort of "last, brief stand." See Ristroph, supra note 190, at
308. Perhaps the reason for this comeback is thatJustice Harry Blackmun simply changed
his mind between Rummel and Solem.
214 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96. Harmelin's possession offense was not trivial. When
detained, he was in possession of 672 grams of cocaine-a truly astonishing amount. Id. at
961.
215 See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.II (suggesting that the proportionality principle
"would ... come into play" in extreme cases, such as "if a legislature made overtime park-
ing a felony punishable by life imprisonment").
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overturned any other, all three "life sentence" decisions remained
good Eighth Amendment law.
2 1 6
But if there is any agreement among Andrade's predecessors, it is
agreement of the most superficial kind.21 7 In these three cases, the
Court develops no clear proportionality substance. No solid propor-
tionality guidance emerges, and no stable analytical model takes form.
Only the din of uncertainty does.
21 8
Over time, this uncertainty has earned its share of critics.
2 19
Some have complained that the Court's proportionality doctrine lacks
focus. Others have suggested that this case law is a project without a
plan-utilitarian, retributivist, or otherwise. 220 And still others worry
that the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine is so jumbled as to be
almost "meaningless"-a "mess[ ]" with no real message.22'
But there is more than aimless clatter in the Court's proportional-
ity noise. There is a subtle Court hint, a careful and quiet signal sent
to attentive state courts. At first listen, this signal may seem insignifi-
cant, doing little more than blandly restating that there is no "clear or
consistent" Eighth Amendment "path for courts to follow." 2 22 But on
additional listens, this signal confirms more than the existence of pro-
portionality's doctrinal mess. It confirms the odd effect that this pro-
portionality mess has had: because the Court's proportionality
doctrine has grown so uncertain and unstable, state courts may forge
Eighth Amendment paths all their own.
216 Cf Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Today, the Court ignores its
recent precedent and holds that a life sentence imposed after a seventh felony conviction
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.... Although
today's holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport
to overrule RummeL").
217 Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 45.
218 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 n.2 (2003) (noting the "'uncertainty' of the
scope of the proportionality principle").
219 See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1648 (1993)
("To judge from the reviews, the Justices are at best making a serious mess of the Eighth
Amendment . . . ."); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 196, at 359 ("The body of doc-
trine produced by the Court is enormously complex and its applicability to specific cases
difficult to discern... [and] remains unresponsive to the central animating concerns that
inspired the Court to embark on its regulatory regime in the first place.").
220 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1079-80 ("Unfortunately, ... constitu-
tional law concerning punishment has developed separately depending on the nature of
the penalties .... The result has been dramatically inconsistent approaches to the Consti-
tution and punishment .... It is time for a more coherent approach to the Constitution
and punishment.").
221 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 196, at 359.
222 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. The "path" metaphor may be a bit hackneyed, but it is no
more so than most other legal metaphors. See Note, ImplementingAtkins, 116 HARV. L. Rv.
2565, 2566 (2003) (calling the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine "a metaphorist's play-
ground," one full of "thicket[s]," "maze[s]," "minefield[s]," and "morass[es]" (citations
omitted)).
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A state court forged a distinctly cynical Eighth Amendment path
in Andrade. In careless and dismissive turns, a California court
doubted the legitimacy of any Eighth Amendment proportionality re-
view. It misread relevant Court opinions. And it disregarded two of
Andrade's still-valid doctrinal predecessors-all before declaring An-
drade's punishment constitutionally secure.
2 23
And nowhere does the Supreme Court say that this clumsy state
court decision was right.224 Instead, the Andrade Court quietly con-
firms something at once more curious and more momentous: It as-
sures that the state court in Andrade could almost never have been
wrong. 225 Had it wished, the state court could have read Eighth
Amendment proportionality broadly, demanding a tight fit between
stolen videos and life in state jail. Or had it wished, the state court
could have read Eighth Amendment proportionality narrowly, af-
firming prison sentences of virtually all types and lengths. Both op-
tions were left entirely open to the state court in Andrade, not because
the Constitution plainly extends state courts both options, but be-
cause unstable substantive law left it to state courts to choose.
In this important way, Andrade clearly resembles Williams. Both
cases exhibit unsettled constitutional substance. Both show how insta-
bility can increase the doctrinal power of state courts.
But where Williams's chapter finishes, Andrade's takes a crucial
second turn. In both Andrade and Williams, confused substance allows
state courts to select among an array of constitutional answers. But in
Andrade, modern habeas procedure adds another layer: It excuses state
courts from the often onerous task of making the right doctrinal
choice.
223 See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224 See id. at 71 ("In this case, we do not reach the question whether the state court
erred ...."). In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003), the Court implies rather
strongly that the state court's decision in Andrade was correct. See id. at 28 ("We do not sit
as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices. It is enough that the State of
California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for
habitual felons advance[ I the goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way."
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the fact that Ewingindirectly affirms
Andrade's state court conclusion only highlights the oddity of the Supreme Court's state-
friendly approach. Had the state court found for Andrade on his Eighth Amendment
claim instead of against him, the Court would almost surely have affirmed nevertheless.
Such was the instability of relevant law and the breadth of the state court's authority.
225 See 538 U.S. at 83 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T] he state court was left to ensure that
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on grossly disproportionate sentences was met.");
Karlan, supra note 191, at 884 n.13.
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C. Unbinding's Second Step 226
Habeas corpus is an awkward enterprise. At times, it can be espe-
cially revealing; at others, it can prove frustratingly opaque. Federal
habeas review of state court decisions can "open [ ] a window on the
workings of our national government. '" 227 It can also pose a series of
seemingly insoluble 228 riddles: Is federal habeas review of state court
decisions irreconcilably inconsistent with fundamental notions of fed-
eralism? 229 Does habeas deserve an exception to formal rules of pre-
clusion and deference? Is the whole habeas project dependent on an
epistemological fiction, a myth that permits "endless" strings of collat-
eral litigation because some "possibility of mistake always exists"?
230
To habeas's many critics, of course, these are hardly impossible
questions. Federal habeas review is, to these critics, a blatant affront
to state autonomy, a pernicious way to make a state institution unnec-
essarily subordinate to a federal one.23 1 All federal habeas review
should do, the critics contend, is ensure that state courts abide base-
line jurisdictional and process-based guarantees-what Justice Pitney
once called "established modes of procedure. ' 23 2 Anything more,
226 I have written elsewhere about a distinct, if related, side of modern habeas corpus
law. See Frederic M. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679, 1702-09
(2005). My analysis here draws rather heavily from that work.
227 Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331, 2331 (1993); see
Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243 (1965); Dal-
lin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966).
228 Yackle, supra note 227, at 2431 (noting that the debate is "charged by ideological
differences that have changed very little over the years").
229 There has always been a kind of paradox built into habeas review: On the one
hand, habeas exists to allow prisoners to challenge-that is, to "appeal"-putatively incor-
rect decisions of law, often those made by state courts. On the other hand, habeas is con-
sidered an extraordinary judicial remedy, not an open-ended opportunity to relitigate state
trials.
230 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REv. 441, 447 (1963).
231 Yackle, supra note 227, at 2333.
232 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915). This process-based limit has not
been easy to defend-at least since 1867. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385, imposes no process limit and announces no exception for partic-
ular types of state court decisions. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitiga-
tion, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 690-91 (1982) ("[U]ntil Stone v. Powel4 the habeas
statute consistently had been interpreted to provide federal habeas review for all constitu-
tional claims regardless of the extent of prior state court litigation."); Yackle, supra note
227, at 2338. So, however valid this process orjurisdiction-based limit may once have been,
it no longer withstands much jurisprudential pressure. SeeJordan Steiker, Incorporating the
Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners , 92
MICH. L. Rv. 862, 881 (1994) ("[1It is simply wrong to assert that the writ known to the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was the same narrowly circumscribed writ known at
English law, or perhaps even known to the Framers of the Suspension Clause."); id. at 888
(noting that the "transformation" of the writ between 1789 and 1868 "strongly supports the
writ's role in protecting national rights in a national forum").
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they say, would risk "bur[ying]" federal courts "in a flood" of often
meridess habeas petitions.
233
This argument has proven difficult to rebut, not least because, in
many ways, the critics are entirely correct. Federal habeas review does
imply a federal distrust of state power, often rather plainly.2 34 It does
smack of appellate review, contradicting ordinary rules of preclu-
sion.235 And it does raise epistemological concerns about "correct"
conclusions and actual right answers, 236 as well as practical questions
about valid substantive "needles" being lost in a "haystack" of "worth-
less" ones.
237
But habeas's numerous advocates still believe the critics wrong.
These advocates argue that federal habeas review should do much
more than guarantee that state courts "act" properly as courts.
238 It
should allow federal courts to remedy state court errors of federal law,
process based or not. Moreover, habeas should permit federal courts
to vindicate federal rights-not because of some fundamentally anti-
federalistjudicial vision, but because doing so will maintain a vigorous
federalist balance, rein in recalcitrant states, and give federal courts
"the final say" (in Justice Frankfurter's words) on the meaning of fed-
eral law.
239
For much of the last half-century, the Supreme Court embraced
this catholic image of habeas review. In Brown v. Allen,2 40 the Court
laid the foundation for an expansive habeas writ, 24 and the Warren
Court readily built on Brown's base.242 In three seminal habeas opin-
ions,243 decisions that some have called the great habeas trilogy,244 the
233 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
234 See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 227, at 2339 (discussing the "friction" that "plenary fed-
eral jurisdiction" may cause).
235 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
236 Bator, supra note 230, at 446-47.
237 Brown, 344 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J., concurring).
238 Yackle, supra note 227, at 2346 (deeming a narrow understanding of due process
"primitive").
239 See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 774 (1998).
240 Brown, 344 U.S. at 443.
241 Yackle, supra note 227, at 2347-48.
242 Id. at 2349 (explaining that the Warren Court treated the writ of habeas corpus as
the "procedural analogue of ... [its] substantive interpretations of the Constitution-
providing federal machinery for bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete
cases").
243 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
244 See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 315, 324 (1998).
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Warren Court fashioned an unmistakably forceful habeas tool, an al-
most omnipotent writ of error.
245
The Court also inspired a great deal of criticism. Some of this
criticism came from the academy. 246 More came, in time, from the
Burger and the Rehnquist Courts. 2 47 And even more came from
overtly political sources, committees charged with the task of revamp-
ing federal habeas law.248 A few of these political initiatives garnered
considerable support; some even made moderate legislative headway.
But nearly all failed to produce much change in the way federal courts
reviewed habeas petitions from state prisoners249-until 1996, at
least.
2 50
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.2 5 1 An elaborate and expansive regulatory effort, AEDPA
revises much of the preexisting habeas paradigm. One AEDPA sec-
tion establishes new exhaustion rules; another erects more rigorous
standards for successive petitions; one section sets a less generous stat-
ute of limitations; another truncates the review process in certain capi-
tal cases. 252 And one AEDPA provision addresses how federal courts
should review the merits of state court decisions, such as the Califor-
nia state decision in Andrade. This state-court-review provision-
AEDPA's § 2254(d)-has proven one of the Act's most prominent fea-
tures. It has also presented AEDPA's deepest "interpretational prob-
lem[ ].,,253 Section 2254(d) reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a per-
son in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim-
245 See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (discussing habeas's role in the
broader context of "criminal administration").
246 Professor Bator, for example, called for a return of a narrow process limit and a
rejection of habeas-created redundancy. See Bator, supra note 230, at 446-48.
247 Some of this criticism manifested in gradual doctrinal retreats from thoroughgoing
habeas review. See Yackle, supra note 227, at 2355-57.
248 Congress has come quite close to undoing Brown many times. The Powell Commit-
tee pushed quite hard in that direction, and it was likely the most prominent of all of the
relevant committees. See id. at 2368-72.
249 See id. 2349-73 (reviewing the history of habeas law in the United States).
250 Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 545-46 (2006) (recounting the conservative backlash against the
expansion of federal habeas).
251 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. II 1996)).
252 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2261-66.
253 Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Man-
ual, 51 VAND. L. REv. 103, 104 (1998).
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
2 54
At first blush, § 2254(d) appears to do very little. It seems simply
to define the manner in which federal courts evaluate the merits of
particular state court decisions. 2 55 It does not, on its face, seem to
undercut the power of federal courts to review the substance of state
court decisions of federal law. 25 6 Nor does it seem to undo habeas's
noteworthy, if formally dubious, exemptions from ordinary preclusion
doctrine and the full faith and credit statute.
257
But § 2254(d) does hint at something significant, as scholars and
inferior federal courts noted from the start.258 Between 1996 and
2000, these observers struggled to find § 2254(d)'s core. Does
§ 2254(d) establish a more deferential standard of review, both for
questions of law and for mixed questions of law and fact?259 How
much does § 2254(d) raise the bar against granting habeas remedies
(if at all)? 260 Does § 2254(d) conflict with Article III's central judicial
vision? Each of these questions tested scholars and courts. Each gar-
nered real, often comprehensive attention.
2 61
Not until 2000, however, did the Supreme Court take a position
on the meaning and effect of § 2254(d). It took that position in Wil-
liams v. Taylor2 62-a kind of authentic Decision Z.
254 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
255 Id.
256 This is no small thing. Whether courts may review is itself an important question-
and not one with an easy answer in every case. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). But it is not a question addressed by § 2254(d).
257 Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381, 401
(1996).
258 See Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 357-62 (6th Cir. 1999);Yackle, supra note 257,
at 401.
259 See, e.g., Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The Court
concludes, however, that the language of new § 2254(d) (1), on its face, clearly expresses
the congressional intent[ ] to create a more deferential standard of review.").
260 See, e.g., Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 888, 891 (1998) ("Congress has plenary authority to determine the degree
to which a state court's judgment will preclude relitigation of the question . . . including
[in] habeas corpus. Congress could prescribe total preclusion, de novo relitigation, or a
middle ground.").
261 See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 239, at 864-84.
262 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Though "Williams" is the most common moniker for this case,
it is one that will cause too much confusion here. I use "Taylor" instead.
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As Taylor reads it, § 2254(d) does something dramatic: it an-
nounces an entirely "new constraint, '"2 63 a novel and severe limit on
federal habeas courts' ability to review state court applications of law
to fact. This new limit derives, the Court asserts, from § 2254(d)'s
distinct "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses. 264 To
fit the "contrary to" standard, a state court decision must either follow
the wrong rule or blatantly misread the facts. 265 To satisfy the "unrea-
sonable application" standard, by contrast, a state court decision need
not follow the wrong governing rule;266 the state court need only ap-
ply that rule "unreasonably to the facts."
267
What "unreasonable" actually means is far from clear, as the
Court readily acknowledges. 268 But what is clear is what "unreasona-
ble" does not mean: "[A] n unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law." 2 69 Had Con-
gress meant "erroneous" or "incorrect," Taylor contends, Congress
would have said so. But Congress made a careful lexical decision not
to say "erroneous" or "incorrect"-and to say "unreasonable" instead.
With this semantic choice, Congress instructed federal courts not to
issue "the writ simply because that court concludes . . . that the rele-
vant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erro-
neously or incorrectly."27 0 Wrong is not enough. To issue the writ
under § 2254(d)'s "unreasonable application" clause, a state court de-
cision must be wrong and unreasonable, i.e., it must be unreasonably
wrong.
D. Unbinding's Substance and Procedure Align
There may be something sensible about Taylors "unreasonably
wrong" approach. 271 Judged by even the most charitable measure,
263 Id. at 412 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); see id. at 411-13; cf id. at 386 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that § 2254(d) merely evinces a "'mood' that the
Federal Judiciary must respect").
264 Id. at 404.
265 The state court, that is, must apply "a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in [the Court's] cases," or it must "arrive[ ] at a result different from [Court] prece-
dent" on a "set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Court.
Id. at 405-06.
266 Id. at 408-09.
267 Id. at 407-08. Taylor also noted that a state-court decision may be "unreasonable" if
it "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Court's] precedent to a new context
where it should not apply (or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new con-
text where it should apply)." Id. at 407.
268 Id. at 410-12 ("The term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define."); see id. at
410-12 (announcing the relevant meaning of "unreasonable").
269 Id. at 410 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 410-12.
270 Id. at 410.
271 Reasonableness surely seems an ever-inviting shelter. At the very least, it seems the
best-and most realizable-way to "achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accu-
racy in the application of law to fact." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due
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habeas doctrine has long been jumbled, if not entirely "Byzantine and
unfathomable. '" 272 Taylor's "unreasonably wrong" standard might of-
fer a hopeful response to a large part of this confusion.
But Taylor's abstract promise comes at a steep practical price.
More than imposing doctrinal "transition costs" or generating friction
at habeas's margins, 273 Taylor subtly shifts the balance of doctrinal
power, this time in a way friendly to state courts. It creates space for
state courts to disregard binding Supreme Court precedent. On fed-
eral constitutional questions, that is, it gives state courts license to be
wrong.274
In some contexts, this price may seem insignificant, a charge
more theoretical than real. Where questions have uncomplicated 275
substantive answers, state courts may have little room to be "reasona-
bly incorrect," let alone doctrinally bold.
But where federal law is not "clear or consistent," where unstable
substance ensures that right answers cannot be effortlessly found, Tay-
Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 311 (1993). For
this reason, courts have used the language of "reasonableness" liberally, nowhere more
prominently than in the qualified immunity context. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511 (1985); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). But "reasonableness" is no panacea.
It often leaves courts in the position of underenforcing constitutional ights, not because
no constitutional violation occurred, but because the error was somehow unobjectionable.
In taking its seemingly-unobjectionable "reasonableness" step, Taylor moves the courts
from enforcing rights vigorously to enforcing little at all. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2507, 2522 (1993) ("The reductio
ad absurdum would be this: when habeas courts grant relief they are disagreeing with the
state courts that upheld the conviction; when there is such disagreement, either position is
presumptively reasonable; hence, every habeas petitioner necessarily . . .cannot obtain
relief [] unless one of two exceptions applies." (footnote omitted)).
272 Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REv.
485, 486 (1995) (measuring the Court's habeas reform effort "by its own terms," not
.against an independent normative perspective").
273 Cf Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789, 793-95
(2002).
274 It is "wrong," Professor Chemerinsky helpfully notes, "to presuppose that decisions
in favor of [individual liberties] are preferable" to decisions in favor of "government inter-
ests." Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REv. 233, 258 (1988). But when the Court permits state courts to stray from
"clearly established" Court doctrine, the question is not whether rights should trump gov-
ernmental interests. The question is whether rights have trumped government interests
according to some still-valid Supreme Court decision. Taylor does not simply invite state
courts to draw unexpected shapes on a clean constitutional slate. It allows them to ignore
the shapes the Court has already drawn, coloring outside preexisting lines. Cf Arthur D.
Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 403, 428 (1996)
("From the earliest days of the nation's history, no function of the Court has ranked higher
than the protection of federal rights from hostility or misunderstanding on the part of
state courts.").
275 Provided that any case has simple answers. See, e.g., BRiAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86-90 (2004) (discussing legal indeterminacy);
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
462, 464, 470 (1987) (citations omitted).
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lor's toll is not so easily gainsaid. In these contexts, correct state court
conclusions become both elusive and unnecessary. For state courts,
reaching correct doctrinal answers becomes a strenuous and avoidable
chore.
In Andrade, substantive law was anything but clear or consistent.
It was, and still is, a tangled doctrinal "thicket,"276 asJustice O'Connor
very aptly noted. So when the Andrade state court misinterpreted
longstanding constitutional "principle [s] ," ignored obvious fact analo-
gies, and brashly disregarded still-valid Supreme Court precedent,
277
it surely did something at least marginally (and doctrinally) wrong.
But the state court also did precisely what the Supreme Court permit-
ted it to do.
The Andrade state court did not need to track the swings of long-
running philosophical debates or plumb the nuances of "uncertain"
constitutional doctrine-like Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin. Nor did
the Andrade state court need to get Andrade's Eighth Amendment
question doctrinally right. The state court needed only to reach a con-
clusion that was somehow "reasonable," a standard that permits state
courts to be wise or hasty, right or wrong.
278
Not all state courts will make use of this permission. Not all state
courts will accept the Court's license to make decisions that are "rea-
sonably incorrect." But all attentive state courts will hear the Court's
unusual cues. And all state courts will register the Court's curious in-
vitation to chart autonomous doctrinal paths, to make "reasonable"
constitutional errors, and to flout still-valid Supreme Court precedent.
So Andrade may begin with a mundane image of an irredeemable
thief, but it ends with a picture far from commonplace. It ends with
an intriguing portrait of an unbound state court, a California tribunal
permitted to elide still-valid Supreme Court case law. Odd as this por-
trait may seem, it is not limited to Andrade's narrow frame. Other
cases cast comparable unbound images. Some of these cases predate
Andrade, helping to set the unbinding stage. Other cases follow An-
drade, inspiring quick, ardent, but still-incomplete debate. Williams v.
North Carolina fits the first category. Roper v. Simmons fits the second.
IV
UNBINDING TODAY: ROPER V. SIMMONS
In some ways, the step from Andrade to Roper v. Simmons is easy
enough. Like Andrade, Simmons features an unsympathetic defendant,
276 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
277 See Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1060-61.
278 Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARV. L. RaV. 1275, 1284-85 (2006) (assessing "close enough is good enough" as a
constitutional standard).
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this one accused of capital murder. Like Andrade, Simmons involves
confused constitutional substance, again of an Eighth Amendment
type. And like Andrade, Simmons captures a state court willing to flout
binding Supreme Court precedent.
In other ways, of course, the move from Andrade and Simmons may
seem a touch forced. Simmons's timing, the gravity of the prescribed
punishment, and the case's procedural posture all differ from those in
Andrade, as well as from those in Williams.
But Simmons, Andrade, and Williams overlap far more than they
diverge. All three form pieces of the same doctrinal puzzle. All three
help tell the story of state courts unbound. This Part shows precisely
how these three seemingly unrelated cases fit together. To that end,
subpart A traces Simmons's litigation path, reviewing the case's legal
history and positing some preliminary explanations for the state
court's noteworthy turn. Subpart B then examines a still-overlooked
piece of Simmons's long path, connecting our more preliminary expla-
nations to the larger theme of state courts unbound.
A. Simmons in the State Court
Roper v. Simmons is a disturbing case-sadly unexceptional in its
horror, but still plenty gruesome to appall. The central event in Sim-
mons is a murder, a grisly and premeditated crime that Christopher
Simmons, then seventeen, boasted he could "get away with" because
of his adolescent age. 279 Upon arrest, Simmons readily confessed to
the killing.280 A state jury convicted him of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to death.28 1 A motion to overturn the verdict was de-
nied on direct appeal.
28 2
Years later, Simmons filed a petition for state collateral relief.
28 3
In his petition, Simmons asked a state court to declare his punishment
inconsistent with the federal Constitution.2 8 4 As Simmons saw it, the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohib-
ited the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.
28 5
At first glance, Simmons's petition seemed destined to fail. In
Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court answered an identical Eighth
279 543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005) (noting that Simmons tied up his victim with electrical
cable and then pushed her into a river to drown).
280 Id. at 557.
281 Id. at 558-59.
282 Id. (citing State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 953 (1997)).
283 Id. at 559.
284 Id.
285 Id.; cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(declaring the execution of offenders age fifteen and younger constitutionally
impermissible).
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Amendment question, rejecting the very argument Simmons now
remade. 286 No Supreme Court opinion had since overruled Stanford,
so the state court's task in Simmons seemed rather uncomplicated: it
merely needed to abide Stanford, denying Simmons's petition without
more.
2 8 7
But the state court did not abide Stanford. Instead, the state court
held that the imposition of the juvenile death penalty had "become
truly unusual"-and thus constitutionally invalid-in the time since
Stanford was decided. 28 8 Simmons's death sentence was overturned ac-
cordingly. Apposite, seemingly binding Supreme Court precedent
was cast deliberately aside.
289
But what inspired the state court's brash and "flagrant"290 turn?
Nothing about the court's decision seems especially careless or indif-
ferent to the meaning of precedent. The state court did not even
pretend to distinguish Simmons from Stanford on the facts. So why
would the state court think the Eighth Amendment was so ripe to be
updated-and that it should do the "'updating' "?291
One reason may be prediction-a concerted state court attempt
to "conform" today's law, not to yesterday's, but to tomorrow's. 292 This
kind of judicial predicting is widely disfavored. In the context of Su-
preme Court precedent, in fact, lower courts have been firmly admon-
ished not to try to "anticipator [ily] overrule." 29 3 But perhaps the
Simmons state court still decided to make a "prophec [y] ," as Justice
Holmes might say,294 boldly putting itself in the Supreme Court's doc-
trinal shoes.
286 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
287 See Bradford, supra note 11, at 43-50 (discussing the Court's rejection of a regime
that permits "anticipatory overruling" by lower courts).
288 State ex rel Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
289 A slim Court majority affirmed without a word about the state court's "flagrant
disregard of [Court] precedent." See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292 See Bradford, supra note 11, at 43-48 (discussing the effect of anticipatory overrul-
ing on judicial efficiency, legal uniformity, and reputational integrity); Caminker, supra
note 72, at 6.
293 See Caminker, supra note 72, at 5 & n.16 (noting the "overwhelming consensus"
against prediction). As a general matter, the task of lower courts is to interpret where the
superior courts' opinions are, not where these opinions may go. But this simple injunction
does have its provisos. Some of these provisos arise "visibly and routinely"-as in the con-
text of Erie doctrine's application of ambiguous state law. See id. Others move "sub silen-
tio"-like an inferior court's hedge against "subsequent appellate reversal." Id.
294 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897), reprinted
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1921). For another familiar Realist's take, see KN.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 59-76 (1960). Some posi-
tivists, like H.L.A. Hart, have been less charitable, calling prediction "unrealistic," Doff,
supra note 72, at 654, a mislabeled expression of some "internal point of view." H.L.A.
HART, THE CONcEPT OF LAW 143 (1961); cf Caminker, supra note 72, at 7 (advocating, in
part, a "proxy" decision-making model over a "conventional precedent" one).
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Another reason may be sheer audacity. Most attempts to buck
Supreme Court authority end badly, at least from the perspective of
those that try.29 5 Most, put simply, get reversed. But perhaps the Sim-
mons state court still felt ready to act impulsively, risking the Supreme
Court's ire and somehow surviving to tell the tale.
There is something useful in each of these explanations. Surely
the Simmons state court felt at liberty to make a doctrinal prediction;
this is, after all, precisely what the state court did. And surely the Sim-
mons state court felt doctrinally daring, for it would not have ignored
Stanford otherwise.
But if these two ideas prove partly instructive, they still leave an
important explanatory hole. Why did the Simmons state court think
that it could make a prediction, let alone that it should? And why did
the state court feel this was a time to be doctrinally bold? To answer
these crucial questions, we must do more than repeat old maxims
about state court predictions or sporadic lower court insolence. We
must reassess Simmons's doctrinal context, connecting Simmons to the
examples Williams and Andrade provide. We must read Simmons, that
is, as a part of the story of state courts unbound.
B. Simmons Unbound
So how does the story of unbound state courts capture Simmons?
Does the core unbinding process-of unstable substance and
overgenerous procedure-even apply?
Unbinding's first piece applies to Simmons rather neatly, for Sim-
mons's substance was inherently unsure. At first glance, of course, Sim-
mons's substance might have seemed perfectly stable: Stanford v.
Kentucky answered an identical Eighth Amendment question about an
indistinguishable punishment for a comparable offender. From Stan-
ford alone, then, it might have looked like Simmons's result was both
obvious and sure.
But the law's stability can be superficial, not least when undercut
by the Court's own doctrinal turns. For Simmons, an unsettling turn
came in Atkins v. Virginia,296 the Court's recent invalidation of the exe-
cution of mentally retarded offenders. On its surface, Atkins's rele-
vance to Simmons seems only passing: Atkins overrules Penry v.
295 See generally Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Suprene Court, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006) (exploring the justifications for the Court's supervisory power
over other courts); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to
Supervise Inferior 7ribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000) (considering the Supreme Court's
power to oversee inferior courts).
296 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Lynaugh,297 not Stanford; the decision addresses the execution of men-
tally retarded defendants, not juvenile ones.
But there is more to Atkins's decision than the rethinking of a
discrete death-penalty judgment. There is a shifting of the Eighth
Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" shadow, what Judge
Posner has called its unconstraining "sponge."298 Even more, there is
a signal to state courts that this Eighth Amendment shifting is not yet
done.
As the Court has long reminded, the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause draws its meaning from "evolving standards of de-
cency."299 From this, it follows that the Eighth Amendment asserts no
"static" constitutional "command."300 And from this, it follows that
the unstable substance in Simmons followed unbinding's path almost
perfectly. In Simmons, the Eighth Amendment formed an inherently
unsettled substantive base, much like full faith and credit did in Wil-
liams and proportionality did in Andrade. So like the state courts in
Williams and Andrade before it, the Simmons state court had an array of
constitutional options. And like the state courts in Williams and An-
drade, the Simmons state court could look into an erratic substantive
"mirror," to borrowJustice Scalia's term, and see whatever it wished to
see.3
01
It is true, no doubt, that unbinding's second piece does not apply
so cleanly. This second piece involves a particular procedure-viz.,
modern habeas review-that Simmons itself avoids: Simmons reached
the Supreme Court on direct appeal, not habeas review. The fuzzi-
ness of the Court's "reasonably wrong" standard, then, did not directly
distort the state court's decision.
But if the fit of this second piece is slightly imperfect, the effect of
overgenerous procedure is no less profound. Doctrinal indulgence in
one setting can, and often does, influence many others.30 2 Once the
Court undercuts its own doctrine in one place-once it declares, to
paraphrase Professor Meyer, that what it says does not always matter-
it cannot expect its "dictates" to hold firm elsewhere.303 "Reasonable"
mistakes in one setting may well lead to more direct and unflinching
297 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
298 See Posner, supra note 49, at 42.
299 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
300 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 588 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. Rev. 148, 148
(2005) ("The Court's jurisprudence of 'cruel and unusual' punishments has both objective
morality and practice components.").
301 See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302 Cf Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Crimi-
nal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 631-32 (1984).
303 Cf Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters" Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REv.
423, 423-25 (1994) (noting that, because Teague limits a habeas petitioner's reliance on
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"errors" elsewhere, not because state courts should believe that such
errors are permissible, but because they have been trained to think so
all the same.
30 4
Some state courts will be rather happy with this training. Some
may be eager to receive it. Some, like the state court in Simmons, may
even be ready to put it to self-indulgent or self-aggrandizing use.
And this may be cause for concern. We may be unhappy with
how the state court acted in Simmons. We may think it better for the
court to have followed Stanfords preexisting rule, no matter how ill-
fated Stanford might have seemed.
But the reason why the state court acted as it did in Simmons is at
least as important as whether it should have. In Simmons, a state court
did what has long seemed forbidden: It disregarded binding Supreme
Court precedent, reinterpreting constitutional doctrine with little hes-
itation or apology. Lower court prediction and state court audacity
surely inform how we understand this bold decision. But to under-
stand Simmons completely, we must dig a bit deeper. We must read
Simmons in the light cast by Williams and Andrade, and we must recog-
nize it as a chapter in the story of state courts unbound.
V
MOTIVES, THEORIES, AND STATE COURT PARITY
There is a coda to this "unbound" story, a final segment left inten-
tionally open when this telling began. This final Part adds no new
doctrinal players, and it recounts no disquieting case narratives. In-
stead, it offers a necessary, if condensed, review of questions posed at
the beginning: What has motivated the Court to allow-let alone en-
dorse-the unbinding of state courts? Should we applaud the Court
for its efforts? Should we worry? And can state courts effectively man-
age their unbound power, now that we know it is theirs?
This short Part raises and responds to these questions explicitly, if
preliminarily. Subpart A assesses possible Supreme Court motives,
noting that no single explanation will do. Subpart B then asks if state
courts can effectively manage their unbound power, situating this
precedent to the specific fact patterns of prior Supreme Court decisions, the Court has
limited the potency of its own holdings).
304 Even Justice Scalia, Simmons's most adamant dissenter, thought the state court's
conduct "understandable." Simmons, 543 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asking why any
"earlier [Court] decision" would "control" a state court's later judgment given that the
Eighth Amendment has been made a "mirror of the passing and changing sentiment of
American society"). But this did not excuse Simmons from criticism by Justice Scalia and
others. The specific targets of condemnation include Simmons's core adjudicative model,
the Court majority's discussion of international law, and its mathematical aptitude-partic-
ularly its counting skills. See, e.g., id. at 610-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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question in now-familiar debates about judicial "parity" and doctrinal
"prerogative."
A. Supreme Court Motives
So why would the Court unbind state tribunals? If it is easy
enough for the Court to rebind them, 30 5 reclaiming the powers it has
quietly given away, why might it prefer to leave things as they stand?
Reading the judicial mind is never easy. 306 The task is only more
complicated when that mind seems only intermittently focused, as it
does with unbound state courts. So if no single reason seems capable
of explaining all of the Court's unbinding behavior, we should evalu-
ate the options all the same. There is some value in the list alone.
One entry on this list may be no reason at all. On occasion, un-
binding may occur through mere accident. Williams's story of full
faith and credit, for example, depicts a state court unbound, not as a
part of some malicious or deliberate Supreme Court scheme, but as
an unintended byproduct of a prudent "accommodation."
30 7
Another entry may be simple resignation. Some legal substance
may defy unerring certainty; some law, that is, may frustrate the
Court's most resolute attempts to "settle[ ]" it.3°8 Andrade's and Sim-
mons's tales of cruel and unusual punishment, for example, portray
state courts unbound in part by the Court's struggles with a stubborn
and unruly bit of constitutional text. 309
And another entry may be deliberate Court strategy, a tacit and
oblique attempt to scale back individual rights. 31 0 This is not a risk-
free approach. It depends a great deal on conjecture-"rough
guess[es]," in Professor Friedman's words, "as to which court system"
305 Perhaps the simplest way to rebind state courts is through immediate Supreme
Court reversal. This is what the dissenting Justices demand in Simmons, see 543 U.S. at
593-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and it is what skeptics of "unbound state courts" will
surely propose. But there are reasons the Court may prefer unbound state courts, at least
in certain contexts. And there are contexts in which modes of Supreme Court supervision
have been so fundamentally revised that easy reversal is impossible. See supra Part V.
306 See Caminker, supra note 72, at 16-19 (noting that while court opinions, public
speeches, and general ideological commitments do provide some useful evidence, Court
motives remain somewhat veiled and obscure, no matter how closely examined); Steven L.
Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441,
1500 (1990).
307 See supra Part II.
308 See generally Alexander & Schauer, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 28, at 1367
(demonstrating that the fraught relationship between Congress and the Court makes set-
ling some areas of law difficult); Alexander & Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy, supra
note 28, at 468 (pointing out that much of the social agenda, fashioned as constitutional
debates, is the subject of continuous dispute).
309 See ELY, supra note 59, at 13-14 (discussing the interpretive "invit[ation]" the
Eighth Amendment extends).
310 SeeYACKLE, supra note 43, at 41.
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will reach preferred ends. 311 But when the Supreme Court "fun-
nel[s]" constitutional power to state courts, it does not always do so
impartially. It may well do so "in the expectation that [constitutional]
relief will be denied."3
1 2
Not every state court will meet this expectation, as Simmons
plainly shows. When the Court opens the door to novel state court
denials, after all, it may also clear the way for newfound state court
grants. But unbinding may well have a substantive tilt, and the Court's
tolerance for unbound state courts surely depends on their delivery of
specific constitutional results.
31 3
As may our own. What we make of unbound state courts may vary
according to our fondness for particular outcomes.3 14 If we are fans
of severe criminal punishment, we may cheer Andrade and jeer Sim-
mons. We may do the opposite if we are foes.
But the reasons for celebration or for worry do not end where the
case law does. There is also a matter of theory, of determining
whether unbound state courts merit our philosophical support.
Little such support is likely to come from "settlement" theorists-
a group Dean Kramer has pejoratively branded members of the "cult
of the Court."31 5 These settlement scholars prefer more certainty, not
less; they advocate consolidated Supreme Court authority, not dis-
persed power. By these measures, unbound state courts look entirely
(and normatively) upside-down: they introduce unpredictability, di-
versity, and instability where order, uniformity, and settlement might
otherwise exist.
3 16
But where settlement theorists find ground for suspicion, some of
their rivals might find reason for hope. One group of thinkers, popu-
lar constitutionalists, may support unbinding simply for its dislocation
of interpretive power, its embrace of a (state court) counterpoint to
311 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 1226 ("Even if one is realistic about the relationship
between ideology and law, one reasonably might wonder if it is healthy that the law of
federal jurisdiction rests so apparently on a bare preference for outcomes .... ).
312 YACKLE, supra note 43, at 41. In this way, the state courts unbound story offers an
interesting historical counterpoint. Until 1914, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to re-
view only those state court decisions that denied a claim of federal right. See Helen Norton,
Reshaping FederalJurisdiction: Congress's Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1003, 1032 n. 118 (2006). Today, these are precisely the kind of decisions unbinding
may quietly promote.
313 Cf. YACKLE, supra note 43, at 121 ("Occasionally, at least, there are reasons for pre-
ferring state court treatment of matters initially (and properly) presented to the federal
courts.").
314 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 1279.
315 See KRAMER, supra note 15, at 243 (citing JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT
43 (1987)).
316 Cf Abner S. Greene, The Fit Dimension, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2921, 2927 (2007). But
see KRAMER, supra note 15, at 234 ("Uncertainty and instability will exist even in a regime of
total judicial supremacy .... ).
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the Court's domineering constitutional voice. 317 Another group, judi-
cial minimalists, may support unbinding simply for its puncturing of
overarching constitutional principles, its shift from grand "fundamen-
talist" leaps to smaller incrementalist steps. 318  And still another
group, federalists, may support unbinding simply for its interest in
state autonomy, its move toward local independence and aggressive
laboratory-like experimentation.3 1 9 All of these thinkers may endorse
unbound state courts, at least in part. All may embrace unbound state
courts for what they symbolize and signal, if not for what they actually
say. All may see great promise in state courts freed to rethink constitu-
tional precedent.
And all will surely know that this promise does not come unen-
cumbered. It is burdened by elusive, unpredictable, overlapping, and
often dubious Court motives-whether inattention, prudence, resig-
nation, or substantive preference. It may lead to state court decisions,
like Andrade and Simmons, that certain Justices disdain.3 20 And it de-
pends heavily on the skills and talents of individual state courts, the
adequacy of which not everyone takes on faith.
B. Parity and Prerogative
From the very start, we have accepted a simple rule of state-court
behavior: state courts may adjudicate federal claims-or most of
them, at least. There are plenty of explanations for this rule. Some
are based in logic, others in history.3 21 But all build from the basic
premise that adjudicating federal questions is a responsibility state
courts can manage.
Can state courts also manage the heady responsibility of being
unbound? If the Supreme Court has indeed unbound them, can state
courts be trusted to wield this important power well?
Much has been written in the last half-century about judicial "par-
ity," the notion that state courts are as able and willing to resolve fed-
eral questions as any other court. A great deal of this parity work has
seemed polemical. Some have called parity a "dangerous" and "pre-
text[ual]" "myth."322 Others have claimed that parity can be philo-
317 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 15, at 234 (assessing popular constitutionalists' fear of
judicial oligarchy).
318 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 27-31.
319 See Van Alstyne, supra note 44, at 771-72 & n.9.
320 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To allow
lower courts to behave as we do ... destroys stability and makes our case law an unreliable
basis for the designing of laws .... The result will be to crown arbitrariness with chaos.").
321 For a detailed discussion of this logic-and a portrait of this history-see Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 WArheat.) 304 (1816).
322 Neuborne, supra note 37, at 1105-06.
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sophically and empirically confirmed. 323 Still others have reminded
that any court "superiority" should not be casually assumed.324 But by
now the parity debate has grown fairly tired.325 No one has supplied
generally accepted parity criteria; no one has found an objective parity
methodology.32 6 Even parity's most renowned adversary has recently
tempered his argument, if not refocused his attention altogether.
32 7
If the parity debate remains (academically) undecided, of course,
unbinding still falls on a particular side. Unbound state courts are
active, if unwitting, champions of judicial parity.3 28 They assert their
own interpretive priority rather than deferring to that of the Supreme
Court. They doubt, amend, and update Court doctrine instead of ap-
plying it mechanically.
They also encroach on a "prerogative" the Court regularly claims
to hold tight.3 29 In stark and emphatic terms, the Court has repeat-
edly said that no other court may reject Supreme Court precedent.
33 0
On these doctrinal matters, the Court tells us, it has no judicial
peer.
3 31
And, at times, the Court would surely like to be believed. But
these forceful declarations of exclusive doctrinal prerogative are at
least partially misleading, as the Court itself well knows. On occasion,
the Supreme Court quietly but intentionally delegates this prerogative
to others-not through a dramatic ceding of its doctrinal authority,
but through the inconspicuous unbinding of state courts. On occa-
323 See MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE &JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVI-
TABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 42-55, 58-62 (1999).
324 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599,
606-11 (1999) (using the experience of gay rights litigators to debunk the traditional no-
tion that federal courts, as opposed to state courts, are invariably more hospitable to civil
rights claims).
325 See Chemerinsky, supra note 274, at 235 ("The debate over parity continues with
little sign of abatement or resolution."). Worse than futile, in fact, "reliance on parity" has
made "a mess of the law of federal jurisdiction." Friedman, supra note 47, at 1223. A real
cost of this "mess" is "doctrinal instability and inconsistency." Id. at 1223 (citation
omitted).
326 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 3 (1980) (explaining that "it would be difficult to devise a system of measure-
ment which could be used to answer" the question of whether "federal courts are, on the
whole, better equipped to guard federal interests than their state counterparts"); Ruben-
stein, supra note 324, at 604-05; Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the
Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 611 (1991).
327 See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 803 (1995) (exploring why we "fail[ ] to use the best resources [availa-
ble] to solve our most difficult legal problems").
328 Consider, for example, the inattentive state court in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
(2003). See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
329 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating that overruling a Supreme
Court precedent is the Court's sole prerogative).
330 See, e.g., id.
331 See id.
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sion, that is, the Court willingly permits state courts to disregard Su-
preme Court precedent. Many state courts are happy to oblige.
Of course, all of this could change quickly enough. A change
among Justices, 33 2 a reworking of particular procedures, 333 an exceed-
ingly rash bit of state court defiance-all could significantly alter
when (or if) state courts can make decisions like Williams, Andrade, or
Simmons. But for now state courts can occasionally do what has long
seemed entirely impossible: they can disregard valid, binding Su-
preme Court precedent. They can act as if unbound.3 3
4
CONCLUSION
Not long ago, Tom Parker wrote an open letter to his colleagues
on the Alabama Supreme Court.3 35 The occasion was Roper v. Sim-
mons, and the thesis was decidedly blunt: Simmons, Parker explained, is
an immoral decision, one based on "ridiculous reasoning" and "for-
eign legal fads." Worse still, Simmons is an "unconstitutional' decision,
one that state court judges must stand against "without apology." 336
As it happened, the Alabama Supreme Court took no such stand.
Far from flouting Simmons, the state court mechanically applied it.337
Parker was soon removed from office. 338 His editorial was dismissed
as a vain and "bilious screed." 339
332 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 72, at 652 ("It would not have taken an especially astute
Court-watcher to predict that Clarence Thomas would cast his votes as a Justice in a pattern
different from that followed by Thurgood Marshall ... .").
333 See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 250, at 544-45 (explaining how an inconspicuous proce-
dural change has transformed the federal habeas adjudication).
334 As Professor Hart has reminded, state courts "are the primary guarantors of consti-
tutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones." Hart, supra note 18, at
1401. But this reminder only goes so far. State courts are not the "ultimate" arbiters of
federal law on matters the Court has already addressed-or at least we don't often think
them to be. So while "the argument that federal rights should be litigated, sooner or later,
in a federal forum can [not] alone carry the day," Meltzer, supra note 271, at 2509, it carries
enough to show the peculiarity of unbound state courts; cf Barry Friedman, ValuingFederal-
ism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 397-400 (1997) (discussing the states as laboratories of experi-
mentation); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARv. L. REv. 2180, 2213-14 (1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rav. 903 (1994).
335 Tom Parker, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1,
2005, at 4B.
336 Id. (emphasis added); cf Spencer Roane, "Hampden"Essay I, RICHMOND ENQUIRER,
June 11-22, 1819, reprinted inJOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106,
110-14 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
337 See Ex parte Adams, 955 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala. 2005).
338 Dahlia Lithwick, Kennedy Made Me Do It, SLATE, June 8, 2006, http://www.slate.
com/id/2143308.
339 Id.
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It is not an inaccurate label. With its frantic rhetoric and its
"poorly reasoned" arguments, Parker's column may well seem like so
much nonsense.
3 40
But there is more to Parker's polemic than hollow spite. Beneath
the angry bluster and the clumsy reasoning is a kernel of long-ne-
glected doctrinal truth: State courts sometimes do "refuse[ ]" to follow
prior Supreme Court doctrine. And sometimes they do so without
fear of Supreme Court "rebuke.
13 4 1
To many, this fact may be a bit threatening, the sign of a gratui-
tous assault on our system of "settled" precedent. To others, it may be
quite welcome, a symbol of the triumph of federalist, minimalist, or
popular constitutionalist theory. And to still others, the idea of doctri-
nal defiance may simply be startling, a strange anomaly in the opera-
tion of state courts. It is not in every case, after all, that state courts
affirmatively choose to disobey.
But rare events still have their lessons, and we should remember
how and why they emerge. By unsettling constitutional substance and
excusing state court errors, the Court has permitted-even en-
couraged-state courts to reshape critical portions of existing Supreme
Court doctrine. It has written the story of state courts unbound.
Some chapters in this story fall in neglected legal corners. Wil-
liams's tale of unstable constitutional substance, for example, appears
in an almost-forgotten parable of full faith and credit and migratory
divorce.3 42 Other chapters line the margins of grim biography. An-
drade's account of procedural pardons, for example, emerges in an
unhappy account of three strikes punishment and stolen videos.
343
Some chapters provoke swift and angry reaction. Simmons's spark of
state court disobedience, for example, drew pleas for a "slap on the
[state court's] hand."3 44 And other chapters are still being written.
The blunt state court defiance of Smith v. Texas,3 4 5 for example, is
quite sure to be repeated.
We may find these chapters intriguing, provocative, or perplex-
ing. We may think bold state courts admirable, curious, or entirely
insolent. But if we are bothered by the state courts' conduct, we
should not be too startled that it occurs. Subtly but methodically, the
Supreme Court has encouraged state courts to do the unthinkable: to
ignore Court doctrine and to act as if unbound. This alone should
340 Id.
341 Parker, supra note 335.
342 See supra Part II.
343 See supra Part III.
344 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra
Part IV.
345 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007).
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make us doubt some of our most familiar rules-like "state courts obey
Supreme Court precedent." And it should remind us that not all of these
rules hold perfectly true.
